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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE BLACKMAN - 1964-1968 
The founding fathers of the United States of America 
drew up a document called the United States Constitution. 
Professor Charles Beard contended in his hook, The Supreme 
Court and the Constitution,that the Constitution was de¬ 
signed by property holding conservatives. They intended to 
provide a governmental system favorable to their interests 
and their notions of the good society. The Blackman was re¬ 
legated to an inferior position in this great document. He 
was given the status of three-fifths of a man in apportioning 
representatives to Congress. Since this period unto the pass¬ 
age of the 13th Amendment, The Blackman was regarded as mere 
property.2 The framers of the Civil War Amendments wanted to 
give to the Blackman the equal status before the law, the 
same status as was given to the white man by law and tradition. 
However, the Supreme Court in various decisions after 
the Civil War systematically emasculated this great purpose. 
^Charles Beard, The Supreme Court and The Constitution 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962.) 
O 
^See Albert Blaustein, Discrimination and the law 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.) 
1 
2 
The Court set up a dual citizenship system as a tactical de¬ 
vice in order to keep the Blackman in a quasi-slavery system. 
In United States v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court said that 
protection of Civil Rights was originally assumed by the 
states and it still had that authority. In 1883, the Court 
4 
said in United States v. Harris. that the equal protection 
of the law clause of the Fourteenth Admendment meant only 
that the states could lay no affirmative racial barriers on 
Blacks and that Congress had no authority to protect the 
freed men from state inaction and inability to conserve their 
rights.^ In another case decided in 1883, the Supreme Court 
said that Congress had no authority to enact the public 
accommodation section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The 
Court established the rule that the state had no jurisdic¬ 
tion in matters regarding individual invasion of another's 
6 7 
civil rights. Then came the famous Plessy v. Ferguson case. 
The Court said that the states had a right to classify Negroes 
on the basis of race, and could deny them access to certain 
public facilities where separate facilities were provided for 
Q 
both races. 
^92 U.S. 542 (1875) 
4106 U.S. 629 (1883) 
5 
An excellent source on the history of the 14th Amend¬ 
ment is Jacobus Ten Brooks Equal Under law (New York: Collier 
Books, 1951) 
6Civil Rights Cases. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
7163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
O 
This case only dealt with discrimination in railroad 
travel, but the separate but equal dictum in this case was 
used to legally separate Blacks and Whites in other areas of 
life. An excellent reference to show the extent this case had 
spread into American life style could be seen in Pauli Murray's 
Book States' Law on Race and Color Women's Division of Methodist 
Church, 1951. 
3 
Since 1896, the Supreme Court has made some effort to 
"bridge the gap between the rights of White people and those 
of Blacks. 
This effort had largely taken place in the area of 
education. The Court steadily chipped away at its separate 
but equal doctrine until the Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka case. In this momentous decision, the Court concluded 
that the separate but equal doctrine was no longer valid in 
Q 
the field of education. 
In the light of this brief background into the relation¬ 
ship between the Supreme Court and the Black man, attention 
should now be given to the purpose of this study. The general 
purpose of this investigation was to do a content analytical 
study of the significant decisions of the Supreme Court in¬ 
volving Black people from the 1964 term to the 1968 term. 
Most specifically the purposes of this study were as follows: 
(1) to discover the voting patterns of the Justices of the 
Court in forty six cases dealing with Black people from 
1964 to 1968; 
(2) to briefly sketch the biographies of the Justices from 
1964 to 1968 with special consideration given to their 
historic relations to Black people; 
(3) To discover why Justice Hugo Black began to consistently 
vote against Black people in 1964; 
(4) To analyze the lewis Steel view of the Supreme Court and 
to utilize the analysis to discuss most of the significant 
cases in this study; 
(5) and to summarize the significant findings from this 
investigation. 
In order to carry out this investigation several re¬ 
source materials were used. They were books, periodicals, 
legal journals, congressional statues, Supreme Court decisions, 
newspapers and magazines. 
^See John McCord ed. With All Deliberate Speed (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1969.) 
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In doing any investigation one must de able to define 
its scope and its limitations. Thus, in this case, this 
study was confined to forty six cases of the United States 
Supreme Court taken from the 1964 through the 1968 term. 
These cases dealt with various problems of Black people being 
considered by the court. These cases were selected because 
they were the significant cases involving Black People heard 
by the Court from 1964 to 1968. In addition they served as 
a representative cross section of various types of litigations 
heard by the court during this period. 
Now, attention should be given to the rationale of the 
procedure of the study. The first chapter dealt with the 
general introduction of the study. In this case the introduc¬ 
tion considered the historical relation of Blacks people to 
the Supreme Court and to briefly state the methodology of re¬ 
search for this study. The second chapter briefly considered 
the biographic sketches of the Justice to Black people. 
The second part of chapter two dealt with an analysis 
of the voting patterns of the Justices in forty-six cases 
which dealt with Black people. The voting patterns of the 
Justices were graphically presented in a chart. In the chart 
the votes of the Justices were divided into two areas. They 
were classified under the heading of either being pro-Black 
or being con-Black. 
In order to determine the appropriate heading the Jus¬ 
tice's vote in the cases in the study should be listed, a 
criteria of selected questions were used. They were as follows 
(a) Did the Justice support full equality in public accommoda¬ 
tions for all Americans?; 
(b) Did the Justice vote represent an effort to bring about 
full equality in the pursuit of educational opportunities?; 
(c) Did the vote of the Justice reflect an effort to bring 
about equal representation for Black people?; 
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(d.) In the free speech cases did the Justice advocate freedom 
of expression for Black people in order to he able to re¬ 
dress grievances against desegregation?; 
(e) In the jury cases did the Justice support the position 
that Blacks should not he systematically excluded from 
juries?; 
(f) In the family relation cases did the Justice advocate 
full equality for all people?; 
(g) Did the Justice support the Black man's right to huy and 
rent property as a White person? 
These questions served as guidelines to follow in deter¬ 
mining how to classify the voting records of the Justices. 
All of the cases analyzed in this study were classified under 
one of the guideline questions forementioned. If the analy¬ 
sis of dictum of the cases and the actual votes of the Justice 
reflected an affirmative reply to the appropriate question, 
then, the Justice's vote would he placed in the pro-Black vote 
column. On the other hand, if the Justice responded nega¬ 
tively, then their votes were noted in the negative or con- 
Black category. This classification was done after careful 
analysis of the various court decisions in this study. In 
addition to just setting up a chart of the voting records of 
the Justices, it was necessary to analyze the significant 
cases in this study. Therefore, the writer decided to 
analyze the cases involving the constitionality of Civil 
rights legislation which passed Congress during the time of 
this study. This was done in chapter three. In chapter four 
attention was given to an analysis of the decisions of Jus¬ 
tice Hugo Black in order to determine why he began to turn 
against the Black man's aspiration for justice. Since his 
actions during the period far out weighed the actions of the 
rest of the Justices, he was given special in-depth study. 
The actions of the rest of the Justices in regard to cases 
dealing with Black people were generally in character with 
their historical background. On the other hand Justice Black 
6 
prior to 1964 had been a strong supporter of the rights of 
minority groups. In the light of these factors Justice Black 
was singled out among the Justices. In Chapter five the 
writer sought to analyze a critical view of the Supreme Court 
by Lewis Steel and to use the Steel thesis as a launching pad 
upon which to carefully analyze most of the significant cases 
in this study. The final chapter was devoted to a summary of 
the significant findings in this investigation. 
In the light of what has been said about this investiga¬ 
tion, it is now fitting to discuss the significance of the 
study. Black Americans constituted over one fifth of the 
American population during the period of this study. The 
Supreme Court was given the responsibility of interpreting 
the United States Constitution. Thus, this institution had 
been delegated the responsibility of manifesting a very 
significant control over the destiny of Black people in 
America. Thus, an analysis of the way the Supreme Court had 
viewed Black people can help Blacks better understand the 
oppressive system which help determine their destiny. 
Such a study of the relationship between the Supreme 
Court from 1964 to 1968 is important because it could serve 
as an indicator both of current change but also potential 
avenues of changes. It is necessary for Blacks to under¬ 
stand how the Supreme Court had viewed the Black man from 
1964 to 1968 in order to better understand the course the 
Court may take in the early 1970's. This study can better 
help one to understand the Supreme Court of 1964-1968 by 
looking at it from various perspectives. The historical 
sketches of the Justices can serve as an indicator of the 
divirgent personalities interacting to help determine the 
destiny of Black Americans. In addition, the analysis of 
the voting patterns of the Justices in cases involving 
7 
Black people tend to serve as a barometer of the areas of 
the law, in which the individual Justices would he more in¬ 
cline to render a favorable decision for Black people. 
One should be mindful of the fact that there is a large 
volume of literature on the Supreme Court of the United 
States.10 Yet the volume of literature about the Supreme 
Court and the Black man is limited. Loren Miller, a Black 
lawyer, wrote probably the only historical textbook about 
the Black man and the Supreme Court. His historical nar¬ 
rative covered the period of 1787 to 1965. 11 In the light 
of this apparent void in the literature this study was de¬ 
signed to help eliminate some of the areas of the literature 
which needed closer examination especially by Blacks 
Thus, this introduction has served as a lamp post to 
future events. Consequently, attention now, should be 
given to the biographical sketches of the Justices who 
served on the Supreme Court during the terms of this study. 
10There are several significant resources to consider 
in order to better understand the Warren Court. Some of 
the best resources are: 
Alexander Bickel. Politics and The Warren Court (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1965.7~ 
Brent Bozell. The Warren Revolution: Reflections On The 
Consensus Society (New Rochelle, New York 1966) 
Arthur Miller. Some Pervasive Myths About The United States 
Court St. Louis University Law Journal 10 (1965) 
John Prank. Marble Palace in Supreme Court In American Life 
(New York; Knopp Press, 1968) 
Harry Kalvern. The Negro and The 1st Amendment (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 19&5) 
11Loren Miller. The Petitioners The Story of The Supreme 
Court and The Negro (New York: Meridan Books, 1966) 
l^See Jack Greenberg's excellent resource book on the 
legal status of the Black man as of 1959, Race Relations and 
American Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) 
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1964-1968 
In a very valuable article for the needed litigation 
for the realization of the Blackman's dream of becoming truly 
a first-class citizen in America, the Honorable Charles Black 
said: 
The most important single task American Law must address 
itself is the task of eradicating racism. The strategy 
of this war must address itself to the state action 
doctrine and to the standardized errors of attitudes 
which go with that doctrine. 
The United States Supreme Court has been given the task 
of interpreting the United States Constitution. Thus, if 
racism is really going to become a tragic page in the annals 
of the American past, then the United States Supreme Court 
must be a catalyst of the erosion of racism in American Law. 
At the end of the 19th century the Supreme Court helped to 
speed the venon of racism in the total blood stream of 
American life, now it must answer the calling of justice for 
all, which cries out for the Constitution to reverse the 
harm in law that it has caused. 
Thus, in keeping with the general theme of this paper, 
this writer will, in this chapter, look at the history of 
the Justices. This would be done to seek to discover the 
historical relationship the Justices have with Black people. 
As this writer purports to look at the members of the 
Charles Black, "States Action Equal Protection and 
California 14” 81 Harvard Law Review 69 (1968). 
8 
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Warren Court from 1968, attention will also le carefully given 
to an analysis of the voting patterns of the members of the 
Court in race cases on cases directly involving Black people. 
The biographic sketches of the members of the Court will 
not be extensive, but references will be made to sources which 
treat the various justices more extensively. The special in¬ 
terest of this writer on the various justices was their rela¬ 
tionship to the black man. 
It would probably be best to begin this inquiry into the 
lives of the individual justices with Chief Justice Earl 
Warren. One should note here that the best personality analy¬ 
sis of the members of the Warren Court was done by John P. 
Prank. This significant work was done on the Supreme Court 
members of 1964* The members of the Court at this time were 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo Black, Justice William 
Brennan, Justice Potter Stewart, Justice Byron White, and 
Justice Arthur Goldberg. Since 1964 there have been several 
changes in the Court. Justice Goldberg and Justice Tom Clark 
resigned from the Court at the end of the 1965 and 1966 terms 
respectively. As a result of these vacancies a Jewish Souther¬ 
ner, Abe Portas and a Black Civil Rights lawyer, Thurgood 
Marshall joined the Supreme Court. 
Now let us briefly look into the background of Chief 
Justice Warren. He was born in Los Angeles on March 19, 1891, 
the son of a Norwegian railroad mechanic. Mr. Warren attended 
the University of California, from which he received his basic 
college and law degrees in 1912 and 1914. Prom 1914 to 1917 
he practiced law in the San Prancisco area. In 1917 and 1918 
he was in the Army finishing as a first lieutenant in the in¬ 
fantry. 
p 
John Prank, The Warren Court (New York: Macmillan Co., 
1964). 
10 
Prom the end of World War I until the present, Warren 
has been active in public life. He was a city and county 
prosecuting attorney from 1919 to 1939- In 1943 he became 
Governor of California and continued in that office until he 
became a Supreme Court Justice in 1953. 
As a Republican Governor of California, Warren gained 
the reputation of being a just and fair-minded person. In 
1947 he told the California Constitution Convention that: 
The heart of any constitution consists of its Bill of 
Rights, those provisions that secure to the people their 
liberty of conscience, of speech, of the press, of law¬ 
ful assembly and the right to uniform application of the 
laws and to due process of law. Every other provision 
of the Constitution should be designed in the spirit of 
these basic rights in order to make sure that they be¬ 
come not mere theoretical rights, but actual rights.* 
In 1953 Mr. Warren succeeded Chief Justice Ered Vinson, 
who died in September of 1953, as Chief Justice. After 
taking over the reigns as Chief Justice, Warren made signifi¬ 
cant progress in the struggle for equal rights for Blacks. 
The historic Brown decisions have credited Warren for his 
efforts to make America adhere to the mandate of racial just¬ 
ice. At a later point attention will be given to the signi¬ 
ficance of the voting patterns of Justice Warren from 1964- 
1968 in the struggle for the eradication of racism in American 
law. 
The next justice to be considered is Hugo 1. Black. He 
was born on February 27, 1886, in Clay County, Alabama. He 
had a high school type of education at the University of 
Alabama at Ashland, Alabama. This was his second choice for 
he wanted to go to the University of Alabama but his grades 
were not satisfactory.^ Thus, he took up the study of law. 
- 
The Warren Court, p. 25. 
4 
Ibid., p. 41. 
11 
He graduated with honors. Then decided to move to Birmingham 
where he opened a law office. He sought to Broaden his appeal 
by joining every organization that he could. 
The question of race can be seen manifested throughout 
the public life of Hugo Black. David Berman said in his arti¬ 
cle, "The Racial Issue and Mr. Justice Black," that Black has 
not had any contact with Blacks on a social basis.5 Yet Mr. 
Berman contends that Justice Black does not have any racism in 
his intellectual makeup. This is a debatable point which will 
be contended with in a later chapter of this discourse. 
Even though he has not had any social contacts with 
Blacks, he has had contact with them on a professional basis. 
As a public official, he had his first contact with Blacks 
when he was a judge in police court at the age of 25 in 
Birmingham, Alabama. At this time about forty percent of the 
people in Birmingham were poor Blacks. Judge Black was re¬ 
garded as a fair minded justice to both Blacks and whites. 
Another instance of interrelation with Blacks occurred when 
Blacks helped Hugo Black be elected Solicitor of Jefferson 
County. His opposition was Harrington Heflin, brother of 
United States Senator Tom Heflin.^ During his tenure in 
office he was instrumental in exposing the corrupt practice 
at that time in Bessemer, Alabama, by the police of using the 
third degree to get Blacks to confess to crimes. Solicitor 
Black presented his critical report of the practice before 
the grand jury of the county.7 
^David Berman, "The Racial Issue and Mr. Justice 
Black," 16 American University law Review, p. 387 (June, 1967). 
6Ibid.. p. 387. 
7Ibid.. pp. 387-388. 
12 
One of the skeletons in his closet which almost pre¬ 
vented Hugo Black from Becoming a Supreme Court Justice was 
the fact that he was once a member of the K. K. K. He was 
asked to join the racist organization, and he officially 
joined on September 11, 1923, and resigned on July 9, 1925. 
It was ironic that this was two days before he announced for 
the Senate. Yet it is interesting to note that the state Klan 
organization favored his election. Mr. Black supported a 
Catholic, A1 Smith, in 1928 for President. Mr. Black was 
opposed for the Senate by Tom Heflin in 1930.® 
After a short, but rather distinguished career as a 
United States Senator Mr. Hugo Black was appointed by then 
President Pranklin Roosevelt to the United States Supreme 
Court in 1937. Prom 1937 until 1964 he was a strong fighter 
for the rights of minorities. He was a great supporter of 
the Brown cases, in spite of the fact he received personal 
vendetta from many Southerners for "betraying the South by 
his actions." He has fought for fair trials for all people 
9 
and freedom of speech for all people. The position of Mr. 
Black since 1964 will be considered later.1(^ 
The third justice to be considered is Justice William 
0. Douglas.11 He was born in Ottertail County, Minnesota, 
on October 16, 1898. His father was a Presbyterian home 
missionary. At the age of six Mr. Douglas' father passed. 
8Ibid,, pT 388. 
^Warren Court, p. 40. 
lOpor Further information on the life and work of Mr. 
Black see the following source: John Prank, Mr. Justice 
Black, The Man and His Opinion (Hew York: Alfred Knopp, 1949). 
11See John Schmidhauser, "The Justices of the Supreme 
Court: Collective Portrait," 3 Midwest Journal of Political 
Science, 1959- 
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Respite the hardship of being a poor hoy, Mr. Douglas earned 
his way through Whitman College at Walla Walla, Washington. 
He served in the First World War and then came home to finish 
his college work in 1920. In 1922 he entered Columbia Law 
School where he graduated in 1925- After three years of law 
practice, two of them with an exclusive law firm, he went to 
join the Yale Law Faculty. Under Lean Robert Hutchins who 
left Yale in 1930 to become President of the University of 
Chicago. In 1939 President Roosevelt appointed William 0 
Douglas. Thus during his career as a justice, Douglas has 
been a strong advocate of individual liberty He has been a 
strong advocate for equal rights and justice for Blacks.^ 
The fourth justice to be considered is Justice Tom 
Clark. He was born on September 22, 1898, in Dallas, Texas. 
He was educated at Virginia Military Institute 1917-1918. He 
received his A.B. degree in 1921 from the University of Texas 
and also his LLB. in 1922.15 
Mr. Clark had led a rather strongly public life. He 
was given the job of Assistant Attorney General in the United 
States Department of Justice due to the efforts of a family 
friend, Senator Tom Connally of Texas. During World War II, 
Clark was appointed Civilian Coordinator to the Western De¬ 
fense Command by President Roosevelt. His duty was to curfew 
all persons who were regarded as enemy aliens, including na¬ 
tive born Japanese, and to relocate them in an inland camp. 
This action was purely racially motivated, for many of the 
Japanese Americans were taken from their homes, and their pro¬ 
perties were confiscated by the state. Mr. Clark simply 
followed the orders of Washington. One should note he argued 
the legality of the curfew regulations. For this racist act 
he gained a significant promotion. He was appointed as Head 
12 
Warren Court, pp. 57-76. 
^Who's Who in American Politics 1969-1970. P« 216 
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of the Antitrust Division of the Attorney General's office. 
His next big appointment was to become the United States 
Attorney General. Then in 1949 after Justice frank Murphy 
died, President Truman appointed Tom C. Clark to fill this 
vacancy on the Court. 
When it was learned that Tom Clark was going to become 
a Supreme Court Justice, he was opposed by many people includ¬ 
ing Blacks. He was charged with being a red-baiting extremist, 
insensitive to rights of free speech and free association. He 
was also charged with being hostile to Black people. Since his 
appointment to the court up until 1964, he has been with the 
majority in substantially every case upholding Negro rights. 14 
The name of John Marshall Harlan is a very familiar name 
to Black people who are concerned about the forces that deter¬ 
mine their destiny. This is the name of a justice who served 
on the Supreme Court from 1877 to 1911. He was a great believer 
that the Constitution is color blind while his associates on 
the courts were advocating a racist second class position for 
the Black man. This man was the great dissenter of his day. 
Today his namesake grandson is the great dissenter on the pre¬ 
sent Court. The present-day dissenter does not vote for the 
Black man. 
Mr. J. M. Harlan was born in Chicago, Illinois, on 
May 20, 1899. He received his A. B. degree from Princeton 
University in 1920. He was a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College 
in Oxford, England, where he received a B. A. in Uurisprudence 
in 1924.^ Harlan's legal career was largely spent on Wall 
Street where he was a case-trying partner for one of the most 
famous law firms in the country, the firm of which Thomas E. 
Dewey is now senior partner. As a result of his background, 
he was a representative of some of the great financial interests. 
14 
John Prank, Warren Court, pp. 77-96. 
15 
Who's Who in American Politics 1969-70. P« 483 
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He was a hero in World War II for he received the Legion of 
Merit from the United States and the Croit de Guerre from the 
French. In 1954, he was appointed to the Court of Appeals. 
In November of 1954 President Eisenhower advanced Harlan to the 
Supreme Court to replace Robert Jackson. From 1961 on the num¬ 
ber of dissents Harlan had written began to steadily increase 1 
The next justice to be considered is William Brennan. 
He was born in Newark, New Jersey, on April 25, 1906. Mr. 
Brennan received his B. S. from the University of Pennsylvania 
in 1928. He received his 1LB from Harvard in 1931. Mr. 
Brennan served as Superior Court Judge from 1949-1950; Appel¬ 
late Division Judge, New Jersey 1950-1952; Justice, New Jersey 
Supreme Court 1952-1956. He was appointed Associated Justice 
17 
of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1956. 
Mr. Potter Stewart was considered as the Justice of the 
World War II generation, since he was only forty-three when 
appointed to the Court in 1958. Mr. Stewart was born in Jack- 
son, Michigan, on January 23, 1915. Mr. Stewart was educated 
at Yale College where he received his B. A., Cum Laude, 1937; 
Cambridge University Fellow, 1937-38; Yale Law School LLB. 
Cum Laude, 1941; Phi Beta Kappa. Mr. Stewart has served as 
Vice Mayor of Cincinnati, Ohio, 1952-53; U. S. Judge, Court 
of Appeals, Sixth Circuit 1954-58 and was appointed to the 
Supreme Court in 1958.18 
Football players are not always dumb. This is evident 
from the fact that a former all-American football player, 
Byron White was appointed to the Supreme Court. This former 
football star was born in Fort Collins, Colorado, on June 8, 
1917. Mr. White was educated at the University of Colorado 
where he received his B. A. degree in 1938. He was a Rhode 
l8John Frank, Warren Court, pp. 97-112. 
^Who's Who in American Politics 1969-1970.P« H°5 
18Ibid. 
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Scholar at Oxford University in 1939. He received his LIB in 
1946 from Yale Law School, and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. 
Justice White served as Law Clerk to the Chief Justice of the 
United States from 1946-1947; appointed Deputy Attorney General 
of the United States from 1961 to 1962. President John Kennedy 
appointed his friend, Byron White, to become Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court.^9 
The next justice to be considered is Arthur Goldberg. 
He was born in Chicago, Illinois, on August 8, 1908. He was 
educated at Crane Junior College where he received a B.S.L. in 
1929. In 1930 he received a J. D. from Northwestern. He was 
Secretary of Labor from 1961-1962. In 1962 he was appointed 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court where he served until 
1965. After the death of Adlai Stevenson, Mr. Goldberg was 
persuaded by President Johnson to resign as a Supreme Court 
Justice in order to become the United States Ambassador to 
the United Nation where he served until 1968. Mr. Goldberg 
20 is a reformed Jew by religion. 
After Mr. Goldberg resigned from the Court he was re¬ 
placed by another Jew by the name of Abe Fortas. He was born 
in Memphis, Tennessee, on June 19, 1910. He married Carolyn 
Agger on July 9, 1935. Mr. Fortas received his A. B. degree 
in 1930 from Southwestern College in Memphis, Tennessee, and 
his LLB. from Yale in 1933. He served as Director of the Divi¬ 
sion of Power in the Department of the Interior from 1931-1942; 
Undersecretary of the Interior, 1942-1946; Assistant Chief, 
Legal Division of the Agriculture Adjustment Administration 
1933-1934• Acting General Counsel National Power Policy Com¬ 
mission in 1941. President of the Commission to Study Changes 
in the Organic Law of Puerto Rico, 1943; Advisor to the United 
States Delegation at meeting of the United Nation in San 
Francisco in 1945 and in London in 1946. He served as Associate 
•^Who's who in American Politics in 1969-1970. See also 
John Frank, The Warren Court. 
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Supreme Court Justice from 1965-1969.^ 
The last justice who served was the first Black Su¬ 
preme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. He was born in Balti¬ 
more, Maryland, on July 2, 1908. Mr. Marshall received his 
A. B. degree from Lincoln University in 1930; LLD, 47, Howard 
University, LL.B., LL.D., 54. Mr. Marshall has been a leader 
in the legal struggle for equal rights for Blacks. His many 
civil rights cases argued by him before the Supreme Court in¬ 
clude the Texas Primary Case in 1944, Restrictive Covenant 
Cases in 1948, University of Texas and Oklahoma Cases in 1950; 
visited Japan and Korea to investigate court martial cases in¬ 
volving Black soldiers, 1951, and School Segregation Cases, 
1952-53, United States Circuit Judge 1961-65, U. S. Solicitor 
General 1965-1967. Director, Counsel Legal Defense and Educa¬ 
tion Eund of the NAACP - 1940-1961, Associate Justice U. S. 
Supreme Court 1967-.*^ 
Thus the little biographic melodrama has ended. The 
elevation of men from the North, from the South, from the 
East and from the West has been mentioned. Nov/, why is the 
type of men on the Supreme Court so important to the black 
man and what was the score card for the individual justices 
in cases involving black people from 1964 to 1968? Supreme 
Court justices are men with various minds and diversified 
backgrounds who interpret the Constitution in terms of their 
own experience, judgements about practical matters and their 
23 
ideal picture of social order. It is quite significant to 
who’s Who in American Politics 1969-1970.p. 433 22  
Ibid. 
25  
Sidney Ulmer, "The Analysis of Behavior Patterns 
on the United States Supreme Court," 22 Journal of Politics, 
p. 629 (I960) 
18 
note that most of the members of the Court had little or no 
experience with Blacks on a man to man basis, mostly strictly 
on a philosophical basis. John Schmidhauser said in his work 
The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait 
that there is a very high frequency among those persons ap¬ 
pointed to the Supreme Court to be persons on a very high 
24 
social status. In addition one should note that Supreme 
Court positions have been frequently used to settle large 
debts in the market places of politics. Thus in the light of 
the great barrier that exists between the upper echelon in 
American society, and the poor black masses, many of the jus¬ 
tices' decisions, during the period studied and during other 
periods, are not attuned of the urgent needs of black America. 
On the other hand one must keep in mind that elite formative 
experiences of the justices could play a significant role in 
their action. 
In the light of this background study, attention should 
be given to an analysis of the voting pattern of the Justices. 
This study of the voting pattern of the Supreme Court Justices 
was taken from the Supreme Court cases from 1964 to 1968. The 
main criteria in selecting the cases was to determine if the 
individual cases directly involved Black people. There were 
forty-six cases selected in various areas. These cases dealt 
with trials, juries, family relation, voting, representation, 
housing, recreational facilities, public accomodations and 
free speech. The data was tabulated on various charts to 
help classify the material. 
This study has brought to light some interesting facts. 
At a quick glance at the chart one would assume that the ma¬ 
jority of the members of the Supreme Court nearly always voted 
in favor of Black people. This position can be readily acquir¬ 
ed from the fact that Justices Marshall's, Portas' and Goldberg's 
^John Schmidhauser, The Justices of Supreme Court: 
Collective Portrait 3 Midwest Journal of Political Science 1 
(1959). 
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voting records showed a 100$ voting record in favor of Black 
people. Yet the realibility or worth of these percentages in 
relations to the total study must be qualified. Justice 
Marshall participated in only five cases considered in this 
study. This limited involvement was partially due to the 
fact that he did not join the Supreme Court until 1967. In 
addition, it was also due to the fact that he had to disqualify 
himself from voting in several cases because he had been in¬ 
volved in the preparation of the cases to be presented before 
the Supreme Court. He had served as United States Solicitor 
General from 1965 to 1967. The extent of his participation 
was 11$ of the forty-six cases. Thus, the 100$ voting record 
of Justice Marshall must be viewed in relation to the total 
number of cases. 
The same criteria should be used to evaluate the voting 
record of Justices Fortas, and Goldberg. Justice Arthur Gold¬ 
berg was a member of the Supreme Court during the 1964 and 
1965 terms of the Supreme Court. 
It was evident throughout the study that the Justices 
tended to be more likely to vote favorably toward the position 
of Black people in certain areas. Chief Justice Earl Warren 
tended to nearly always vote in favor of the position of Black 
people. His pro-Black voting record was 96$. He only voted 
against the position of Black litigants in two cases. One 
dealt with public accommodations and the other case dealt with 
free speech. 
One should especially note that Justice Black had been 
considered as one of the leaders of the liberal wing of the 
Court prior to 1964.2^ His opinions and voting record in this 
^See "Civil Rights Symposium" 45 University of Detroit 
Law Journal 255 (1965) for an analysis of the significant cases 
involving Black people from the perspective of analyzing the 
decisions of the Justices from I960 to 1964. 
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study showed he had joined with Justice Harlan to he the 
leader of the members of the court to consistently vote 
against Black people. This action by Justice Black will be 
further considered in a later chapter. Since this study was 
about the role of the Supreme Court toward the Black man from 
1964 to 1968 it was felt necessary to consider the actions of 
Justice Black. He seemed to have reversed his earlier ten¬ 
dencies to vote in favor of Black people before the Supreme 
Court. From the study several noteworthy facts were discover¬ 
ed. Justice Black participated in 45 out of the 46 cases. 
He tended to vote overall in favor of the position of Black 
people in 55$ of the cases. He was more inclined to vote in 
favor of Black people in cases involving education, voting, 
representation, and family relations, than in cases involving 
free speech, and recreational facilities. 
Attention should now be given to the voting records of 
Justice Douglas and Justice Clark. Justice Douglas had an 
overall pre-Black voting record of 96$. He voted against the 
position of Black people in a housing case and a public ac¬ 
commodation case. On the other hand Justice Clark participated 
in 37 of the 46 cases. He had an overall pre-Black voting 
record of 70$. He tended to vote in favor of Black people in 
the areas of education, public accommodation, recreational 
facilities, voting and representation. On the other hand, he 
tended to vote against the claims of Black people in the areas 
of free speech and trials. 
The next two Justices to be considered were Justices 
Harlan and Justices Brennan. Justice Harlan participated in 
all of the cases. He tended to vote in favor of the position 
of Black people in only 41$ of the 46 cases. He only voted 
in favor of Black people in some cases dealing with education, 
public accommodation, Juries and representation. His voting 
record tended to be that of his historical background of being 
21 
the legal defender of the financial power structure of Wall 
Street. His voting record in favor of Black people in the 
other areas tended to range from fifty per cent to zero per 
cent. On the other hand, Justice Brennan had a better voting 
record. He tended to have an overall voting record of 88% of 
the cases in favor of Black people. The only area in which 
there was a significant dissenting voting pattern against the 
position of Black people was in the area of public accommoda¬ 
tions . 
Now attention should be given to Justice Stewart and 
Justice White. Justice Stewart participated in 45 of the 
cases. He tended to vote in favor of Black people in 71% of 
the cases. He voted in favor of Blacks in nine out of ten 
areas of consideration. He voted against Black people in 
cases dealing with free speech. On the other hand Justice 
White's record was not very different from Justice Stewart. 
Justice White voted in favor of the constitutional claims in 
65% of the 46 cases. He tended to vote against the position 
of Black people in the areas of free speech and public accom¬ 
modations . 
One should keep in mind the fact that the historical 
background of most of the Justices supported the view that 
they did not generally have much dealing with Blacks on a 
social level. This feature was regarded as a common contribut 
ing factor to the perpetuation of White racism in public insti 
tutions. One can not adequately understand the voting record 
of the Justices in this study without understanding the nature 
of the cases under consideration. Thus, an analysis of the 
significant cases are in order. The period of 1964 to 1968 
was noted for the passage of several significant Civil Rights 
laws. Thus, it seem in order to begin the analysis of the 
significant cases with an analysis of the cases in this study 
which dealt with determing the constitutionality of the Civil 
Rights Acts passed by Congress during the time of this study. 
TABLE I 
























Pro Con Pro Con 
Education 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 
Family 
Relations 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
Public 
Accom. 7 1 4 4 7 1 7 1 7 1 2 6 7 1 3 5 6 0 
Recre. 
Fac. 3 0 0 3 3 0 2 1 0 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 0 
Free 
Speech 7 1 2 5 8 0 2 6 2 6 6 2 2 5 3 5 4 0 4 0 
Housins 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 
Juries 3 0 2 1 3 0 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 0 
Trials 8 0 4 4 8 0 0 2 4 4 8 0 6 2 5 3 8 0 3 0 
Voting 6 0 4 2 6 0 6 0 3 3 6 0 5 1 6 0 3 0 3 0 
Represen¬ 
tation 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Total 44 2 25 20 44 2 26 11 19 27 45 5 32 13 30 16 29 0 15 0 5 0 
Per¬ 
centage 96 4 55 45 96 4 70 30 41 59 88 12 71 29 65 35 100 0 100 0 100 0 
CHAPTER III 
THE SUPREME COURT AMD THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS 
SINCE 1964 
In an address at Howard University on June 4, 1965, 
President Johnson announced plans for a White House Con¬ 
ference on Civil Rights. He said: 
Nothing in any country touches us more profoundly, and 
nothing is more freighted with meaning for our own 
destiny than the revolution of the Negro American .... 
In our time change has come to this nation too. The 
American Negro, acting with impressive restraint, has 
peacefully protested and marched demanding a justice that 
has long been denied. The voice of the Negro was a call 
to action. But it is a tribute to America that, once 
aroused the Courts and Congress, the President and most 
of the people have been the allies of progress. . . . 
Thus we have seen the high Court of the country declare 
that discrimination based on race was repugnant to the 
Constitution, and therefore void. We have seen in 1957, 
I960 and again in 1964, the first civil rights legisla¬ 
tion in this nation in almost an entire century. These 
victories as Winston Churchill said of another victory 
for freedom - is not the end. It is not even the begin¬ 
ning of the end but it is, perhaps the end of the begin- 
ing.1 
The Black man has had some victories but far too many 
losses. The Supreme Court has said that discrimination based 
on race is unconstitutional. The Court has made some progress 
to eliminate the badge of servitude that confronts the American 
Black man. This chapter will look at decisions of the Supreme 
•^Revolution in Civil Rights Congressional Quarterly 
Service, June 1968, p. 26. 
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Court that address themselves to the Civil Rights Acts which 
were passed by Congress in 1964, 1965, and in 1968. Attention 
will be devoted to analyzing the cases from the perspective of 
a truly substantive effort to bridge the gap between deliberate 
speed to eliminate racism and institutional evasion of determin¬ 
ing the constitutionality of the Black's rights. One should 
notice that the cases during this period made some strides for¬ 
ward, but the Court did not go as far as it could have in order 
to destroy the stamp of state support of institutional racism 
in the American system. 
There were three significant cases in which the Supreme 
Court dealt with the constitutionality of the 1964 Civil Rights 
2 
Act. These cases were Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 
3 A 
Katzenbach v. McClung, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill. The 
Supreme Court had opportunities to face the issues of institu¬ 
tional racism and to stamp out the badge of prejudices. Yet, 
again the Court resorted to utilizing historical institutional 
evasive practices. The Court did make some movement toward 
freedom for the Black man, but did not move far enough to bring 
victory for freedom.. 
Attention should be now given on a closer basis to the 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States case. This case dealt 
with a declaratory judgment action attacking the constitution¬ 
ality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.^ This 
section dealt with public accommodations which was the most 
controversial section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The 
2379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
5379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
4379 U.S. 306 (1964). 
^See the provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (HR7152-- 
PL88-352) in Revolution in Civil Rights. Washington: Con¬ 
gressional Quarterly Service, June 1968, pp. 62-65. 
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legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress based 
the Act on section five of the 14th Amendment, which gave 
Congress the authority to pass any legislation which was 
needed in order to enforce the provisions of the 14th Amend¬ 
ment. In addition, the Act was also based on the Equal Pro¬ 
tection Clause of the 14th Amendment, as well as on Congress' 
power to regulate interstate commerce under Article I, para¬ 
graph 8 Clause 3 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court did 
not consider the constitutionality of the Act under section 
five of the 14th Amendment, but only on the commerce clause. 
There is some dictum in the Court's opinion by Justice Clark 
that substantiates the institutional evasive techniques of 
the Court. The Court quoted the Senate Commerce Committee 
contention that the fundamental object of Title II was to 
vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely 
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments. 
The committee also noted that the objective could be achieved 
by congressional action based on the commerce power of the 
Constitution. Justice Clark said: 
Our study of the legislative record, made in the light 
of prior cases has brought us to the conclusion that 
Congress possessed amply power in this regard, and we 
have therefore not considered the other grounds relied 
upon. This is not to say that the remaining authority 
upon which it acted was not adequate, a question, upon 
which we do not pass but merely that since the commerce 
power is sufficient for our decision here we have consid¬ 
ered it alone. Nor is 201(d) or 202 having to do with 
state action, involved here and we do not pass upon these 
sections. 
Section II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was consid¬ 
ered as the most controversial section. In 1875 the Congress 
£ 
Thomas Emerson, David Haber, and Norman Dorsen ed., 
Political and Civil Rights in the United States (Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co., 1967), pp. 2138-2139. 
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passed a similar act which broadly proscribed discrimination 
in inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters and 
other places of public amusement without limiting the cate¬ 
gories of affected businesses to those impinging upon inter¬ 
state commerce. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was declared 
unconstitutional in the famous Civil Rights Cases. Justice 
Clark concluded in the Court's opinion that: 
The Civil Rights Cases have no relevance to the basis 
of decision here where the Act not only explicity re¬ 
lies upon the commerce power, but the record is filled 
with testimony of obstructions and restraints resulting 
from the discrimination found to be existing.' 
In the concluding remarks of the Court's opinion 
Justice Clark said: 
We, therefore, conclude that the action of the Congress 
in the adoption of the Act as applied here to a motel 
which concededly serves interstate travellers is within 
the power granted it by the commerce clause of the 
Constitution ... It may be argued that Congress could 
have pursued other methods to eliminate the obstructions 
it found in interstate commerce caused by racial dis¬ 
crimination. But this is a matter of policy that rests 
entirely with the Congress not with the courts. It is 
subject only to one caveat - that the means chosen by 
it must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by 
the Constitution. We cannot say that its choice here 
was not so adapted. The Constitution requires no more. 
It is very evident that the Court had sought to elim¬ 
inate another one of the badges of servitude. Yet, the 
manner in which the Court took to accomplish this task brings 
out the fact that institutional racism is a reality.^ Even 
in 1964, the Black man was still regarded as a piece of 
property. Justice Douglas realized this fact in his concurring 
?379 U.S. 241. 
8 
Ibid. 
%ee Melville Nimmer, "A Proposal for Judicial Valida¬ 
tion of a Previously Unconstitutional Law: The Civil Rights 
Act of 1875." 65 Columbia University Law Review, 1394 (1965). 
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opinion. He said: 
It is rather my belief that the right of people to be 
free of state action that discriminates against them 
because of race . . . occupies a more protected posi¬ 
tion in our constitutional a system than does the move¬ 
ment of cattle.10 
If the Court had not decided the case solely on the 
commerce clause, then the companion cases, Katzenbach v. 
II ip 
McClung. Hamm v.City of Roch Hill would not have been 
necessary. The Katzenbach v. McClung case dealt with a 
family-owned restaurant. The Court found that a substantial 
proportion of the food served in the restaurant had moved in 
interstate commerce and therefore came under the act. 
The third case to be considered is Hamm v. City of 
Rock Hill. The Court vacated state court convictions under 
state trespass laws for peaceful sit-ins at lunch counters. 
This case dealt with a situation that took place before the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but the case was 
still pending in the courts. There is also dictum in the 
court opinion by Justice Clark which points out the institu¬ 
tionalize evasive tactics which are employed by the courts. 
Justice Clark said: 
Where Congress sets out to regulate a situation within 
its power, the Constitution affords it a wide choice of 
remedies. This being true, the only question remaining 
is whether Congress exercised its power in the act to 
abate the prosecutions here. If we held that it did not 
we would then have to pass on the constitutional question 
of whether the Fourteenth Amendment without the benefit 
of the Civil Rights Act, operates of its own to bar 
criminal trespass convictions, where, as here they are 
used to enforce a pattern of racial discrimination . . . 
10379 Ü.S. 241. 
11379 U.S. 294. 
12379 U.S. 306. 
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some of the justices joining this opinion believe that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does so operate . . . Since we 
have found Congress has ample power to extend the statute 
to pending convictions that we arreid that question by 
favoring an interpretation of the statute which renders 
a constitutional decision unnecessary. ^ 
Again the Court failed to really face the true issues. 
This institutional practice has prolonged the day when equal 
rights for all will become a reality instead of a goal for 
blacks. The Court in this case and in the other cases dealing 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had moved forward and back¬ 
ward in its deliberation on the constitutional issues presented 
to it. 
Another chapter in the struggle for justice for the 
black man was written in 1965 with the passage of the 1965 
Voting Rights Act. In an attempt to get the Court to declare 
the main portion of the Act unconstitutional, the state of 
South Carolina filed a federal suit to bring the issues before 
the Supreme Court. The suit sought to enjoin the Attorney 
General Nicholas deB Katzenbach from enforcing the Act on 
grounds that the law unconstitutionally invaded states’ rights 
to set voter qualifications.14 In an unanimous Court opinion 
written by Chief Justice Warren, the court said that after 
nearly a century of widespread resistance to the 15th Amend¬ 
ment, Congress has marshalled an array of potent weapons 
against the evil, with the authority of the Attorney General 
to employ them effectively. Justice Warren said that Congress 
could use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional 
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting. Consequently, 
the Court denied the bill of complaint. 
Another significant case in which the court considered 
the constitutionality of the 1965 Voting Rights Act was 
15 Katzenbach v. Morgan. This case dealt with determining the 
15379 U.S. 306. 
14383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
15379 U.S. 294. 
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legality of the New York English literacy requirement in order 
to vote. This case had to decide if the literacy test of New 
York conflicted with section 4 (e) of the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act.1^ The Supreme Court said that section 4 (e) is appro¬ 
priate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of 
the 14th Amendment. 
Again the Court has helped to chip away a little more 
of the vestiges of slavery. The Supreme Court has continued 
to utilize its institutionalized prejudices hut has brought 
about some victories. There are still other barriers to 
cross in order to bring about true equality. In addition to 
the right to vote the Black man has wanted to be able to really 
have the right to find a decent home to call his own. The 
courts have helped to create the problem. In 1968, the Supreme 
Court took a giant step forward in the area of housing. Thus, 
attention should now be given to see exactly what the court 
did in 1968 after the passage of the comprehensive 1968 Housing 
Act. 
16 °This section declared: Congress hereby declared that 
to secure the rights under the 14th Amendment of persons educa¬ 
tion in America - flag schools in which the predominant class¬ 
room language was other than English, it is necessary to pro¬ 
hibit the states from conditioning the right to vote of such 
persons on ability to read, write, understand or interpret any 
matter in the English language. (2) No person who demon¬ 
strates that he has successfully completed the sixth primary 
grades in a public school in, or a private school accredited 
by any state or territory, the District of Columbia or the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant class¬ 
room language was other than English, shall be denied the right 
to vote in any Federal State, or local election because of his 
inability to read, write, understand or interpret any matter 
in the English language ... he shall demonstrate that he has 
successfully completed an equivalent level of education in a 
public school in any state territory, the District of Columbia, 
or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant 
classroom language was other than English. 
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In 1968 the Congress passed a Comprehensive Housing Act. 
This Act prohibited discrimination in the sale of rental of 
about 80 percent of all housing. Most of the housing built 
with federal assistance was covered by the Act. Single 
family houses that are not owned by private individuals are 
also covered under the Act. Private owners selling or renting 
their house without the services of a real estate agent or 
broker were exempted. The prohibition against discrimination 
also applied to financing and brokerage services.^ 
During the period from the time of the passage of the 
Act and the closing of terms of the Court in June 1968, the 
Court did not have to determine the constitutionality of the 
Act. However, the Court decided after the passage of the 
massive housing act to again consider a case involving the 
1866 Housing Act (42USC 1982). The question presented to 
the Court was to determine the scope and the constitutionality 
of this Act of Congress which declared: "All citizens in the 
United States shall have the same rights as is enjoyed by 
whites thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property." This was the Jones v. 
1 O 
Maver case. The Court declared that Congress has authority 
to enforce the 13th Amendment by appropriate legislation 
which included power to eliminate racial barriers acquisitive, 
real and personal property. In this case the Court admitted 
that the state can pass legislation to fight group prejudice. 
In other words the state has authority to eradicate all of 
the badges of slavery. This is really what Justice Douglas 
said in his concurring opinion that: 
17 
'Revolution in Civil Rights, p. 84. 
18 
392 U.S. 409. 
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Enabling a Negro to buy and sell real and personal pro¬ 
perty is a removal of one of many badges of slavery. . . 
The true curse of slavery is not what it did to the 
black man, but what it has done to the white man. For 
the existence of the institution produced the notion 
that the white man was of superior character, intelli¬ 
gence and morality. . . Some badges of slavery remain 
today while the institution has been outlawed, it has 
remained in the minds and hearts of many white men.19 
One could not be certain why the Court decided to take 
this forward step at the time that it did. It may have felt 
that the temperament of the times demanded such a course of 
action. It is possible that the death of Dr. Martin King 
and the subsequent riots may have influenced the Court and 
also this course of action may have been due to the nature 
of the personnel on the Court. Either one or a combination 
of the forementioned reasons may have prompted the Court to 
act. 
The relation of the Supreme Court to the Civil Rights 
legislation passed Congress from 1964 to 1968 was one of the 
significant facets of the court during the period of the 
study. Another important aspects of relation of the Supreme 
Court during this period was action of Justice Hugo Black. 
He had been, prior to 1964, a strong supporter of the Consti¬ 
tutional rights of Black people tended to reverse his ear¬ 
lier support of Black people. However, his action, since 
1964, in cases involving Black people tended to reverse his 
earlier support of Black people. Thus, attention should be 
now given to the voting record of Justice Black in the cases 
in this study in order to determine what areas Justice Black 
supported Black people and in what areas he did not. Thus, 
the relation Justice Black had to Black people after 1964 
manifested such a dorminant feature of the voting patterns of 




JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND THE BLACK MAN SINCE 1964 
One of the most interesting, yet puzzling justices on 
the Supreme Court is Justice Hugo Black. He is a Southern 
justice from Alabama who helped to spearhead the Supreme 
Court to unite behind the Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka decision. He was viewed as a traitor to the Southern 
way of life for his part in rendering this decree. In addi¬ 
tion to personal criticism of him as an individual, his fami¬ 
ly was also scorned. Justice Black's son Hugo, Jr. was driv¬ 
en from his law practice in Alabama and had to relocate in 
Florida. Even though Justice Black had been denounced as a 
traitor to the glory of the South, he still regarded himself 
as a true Southerner. In fact, he maintained a policy that 
at least one of his law clerks must be from Alabama.1 In 
the light of the fact that up to 1964, Justice Black's action 
on the Supreme Court has expressed a degree of sensitivity to 
the constitutional needs and rights of the black man, his ac¬ 
tions since 1964 is difficult to understand. Prior to 1964 
Justice Black had played a significant role in the desegre¬ 
gation of public school cases; led in the movement to apply 
1David Berman, "The Racial Issue and Mr. Black," 16 
American University Law Review, p. 390 (1967). 
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the Bill of Rights to the states; was a militant supporter 
of free speech and was a leader in the drive to provide 
equal representation for all Americans in state legislatures 
p 
and Congress. Since 1964, there has been a change in the 
philosophy of Hugo Black toward the Black man or there had 
really been a sudden awakening of a Southern racist who has 
decided to return to the fold. The change in the position 
of Justice Black is analyzed in a study of his voting pat¬ 
terns and decisions on cases directly involving Black people. 
These cases were decided between the 1964 and 1968 terms of 
the Supreme Court. 
The first inkling of the new picture of Mr. Black 
toward the Black Americans, as a people, came with his dis¬ 
sent in Bell v. Maryland. This was the first written opinion 
of Justice Black since the beginning in 1961 of the Sit-In 
Movement in the South. The action of Justice Black in this 
decision and in other decisions stresses the importance of 
the priority of property rights over human rights. 
In Bell v. Maryland^ Justice Black presented an 
interesting but rather racist argument. This case involved 
a group of sit-in demonstrators at Hooper's Restaurant in 
Baltimore, Maryland, who failed to leave the restaurant, 
when requested by the owner. As a result, the demonstrators 
were arrested for violation of the no-trespass law of the 
state. These persons were convicted and appealed their 
convictions. Between the arrest and the presentation of the 
case before the Supreme Court the state of Maryland passed 
a public accommodation law which made it a state right for 
the demonstrators to eat in Hooper's Restaurant. This case 
presented the Court with an excellent opportunity to decide 
^John Frank, The Warren Court (Hew York: The Mac¬ 
millan Co., 1964), p. 39* 
3378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
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that the demonstrators had a federal right to eat in any pub¬ 
lic restaurant. Since Congress was considering passing the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, the Court decided again to avoid the 
substantive issues by talcing its traditional method of rely¬ 
ing on state law when possible instead of ruling on consti¬ 
tutional issues. The court decided to remand the case to the 
lower court to reconsider the case in the light of the new 
state public accommodation law. 4 
Justice Black wrote in this case his first opinion 
of the sit-in cases. Justice Black did not feel the Court 
should have remanded the case to the lower court. He pre¬ 
sented a rather strong argument for the right of the proper¬ 
ty owner to do as he pleased with his property. In his dis¬ 
sent there was certain dictum used by Black to bring out ra¬ 
cism in his beliefs. 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: 
No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liber¬ 
ty or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro¬ 
tection of the laws. This section of the Amendment, 
unlike other sections, is a prohibition against cer¬ 
tain conduct only when done by a State. State action, 
as it has come to be known - and 'erects no shield 
against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory 
or wrongful.' 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) . . . The 
Amendment does not forbid a state to prosecute for 
crimes committed against a person or his property, how¬ 
ever prejudiced or narrow the victim's views may be. . . 
Our society has put its trust in a system of criminal 
laws to punish lawless conduct. . . It would betray our 
whole plan for a tranquil and orderly society to say 
that a citizen, because of his personal prejudices, 
habits, attitudes, is cast outside the law's protection 
and cannot call for the aid of officers sworn to uphold 
the law and preserve the peace. . . None of our past 
cases justifies reading the Fourteenth Amendment in a 
way that might well penalize citizens who are law-abid¬ 
ing enough to call upon the law and its officers for 
protection instead of using their own physical strength 
or dangerous weapons to preserve their rights. 
4Ibid. 
^Albert Blaustein and Robert Zangrando Civil Rights 
and the American Negro - A Documentary History (New York: 
Trident Press, 1968), pp. 520-521. 
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This argument by Justice Black simply said that Black people 
should not force their constitutional rights. Black people 
should not force themselves on others. Mr. Black believed 
that property rights should take priority over the right of 
life and liberty. For a man who had taken pride in his 
knowledge of history and the law Justice Black has failed 
to grasp the significance of the state action concept found 
in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In the majority concurring opinions Justices Douglas 
and Goldberg saw the need for a more just relationship among 
the people of the United States. This belief is implied in 
their decision. The Declaration of Independence states a 
great American creed for more just order in American society. 
This creed set the guidelines for a just enactment of the 
general welfare. 
The ideals of the American creed were not fully 
achieved with the adoption of the American Constitution be¬ 
cause of the tragedy of slavery; the Constitution while 
heralding liberty, in effect declared all men free and equal 
except Black men. This inconsistency reflected a fundamental 
departure from the American creed. This departure was supposed 
to be set right by the American Civil War and the adoption of 
the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the constitutional free¬ 
dom and equality were guaranteed expressly for all persons re¬ 
gardless of race.^ Justice Douglas said that in the light of 
this American commitment to equality and the history of the 
commitment, these amendments (13th, 14th and 15th) must be 
read not as legislative codes which are subject to continuous 
revision with changing course of events, but as revelations 
Negro - A Documentary History (New York: Trident Press, 1968), 
pp. 520-521. 
6 
U. S. v. Reese 92 U.S., p. 244. 
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of great purposes which, were intended to be achieved by the 
Constitution. This point can be drawn from the Court de- 
7 
cision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania. This Court said in essence 
that when a federal right is guaranteed by the Constitution, 
the fair application or enforcement of that right has been 
given to the national government which has been clothed with 
appropriate authority and functions to enforce that right. 
The Supreme Court was able to find constitutional support of 
slavery; now the Court should support true equality in America. 
Justice Black cannot avoid the revolutionary intent of 
the Civil War Amendments. It is interesting but rather puz¬ 
zling to see Justice Black's rationale for the defense of 
property rights. Apparently he has forgotten his decision of 
Marsh v. Alabama, or the type of litigants in both cases may 
have caused a change in the view of Justice Black. In Justice 
Black's famous decision in Marsh v. Alabama he said: "The 
more an owner, for his advantage opens up his property for 
use by the public in general, the more does his rights be¬ 
come circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights 
o 
of those who use it."° Justice Black's position had changed 
considerably in Bell v. Maryland from his position in Marsh 
v. Alabama. In the Marsh case he contended that there are 
limits to the rights of property owners. In Bell v. Maryland, 
Justice Black took the position that the state had virtually 
a duty to protect the property owners' rights over against 
any rights of others. The defense of property rights as in 
the Bell case has become a significant feature of the court 
decisions of Justice Black after 1964. It was Justice Black's 
sincere belief in Bell that the demonstrators and the property 
716 Peters U.S. (1842). 
g 
John Prank, Mr. Justice Black - The Man and His Opinions 
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1949), p. 266. 
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owner would put their trust in the legal remedies for the 
airing and settlement of grievances. This viewpoint was es¬ 
pecially true in the cases when Blacks actively sought their 
equal rights outside the courts.9 
The change in the philosophy of Justice Black has been 
compared with changes of view by Justice Frankfurter. James 
Kilpatrick, a conservative newspaperman said Justice Black 
has followed the trend of the once radical Justice Frankfurter 
and just mellowed with age. This may be true. Justice Black 
reached the age of 78 years old when he began to follow a 
rather conservative point of view.10 
In keeping with his precedence set in the Bell v. Mary¬ 
land dissent, he restated or reaffirmed his position in several 
other significant cases from 1964 to 1968. During this period 
Justice Black began to draw practical lines on the limitation 
of individual freedom of action. He began to assert the view 
that the constitutional protection of expression must be inter¬ 
preted only in the light of the forces of which are dictated 
by an orderly society governed by the constitutional rule of 
-, 11 law. 
In Brown v. Louisiana the court overruled a conviction 
of four Blacks for staging a protest of the segregation prac- 
12 tices in a public library. In a concurring dissent Justice 
Black along with Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart did not 
agree with the majority opinion. Justice Black believed that 
it was wrong to protest segregation in a public place like the 
^A. E. Howard, "Mr. Justice Black: The Negro Protest 
Movement and Rule of Law," 53Virginia Law Review 1070 (June, 
1967). 
10Stephen Strickland, "Mr. Justice Black: A Reappraisal," 
25 Federal Bar Journal 381 (1965). 
1 Charles Rice, "Justice Black: The Demonstrators and 
a Constitutional Rule of Law" UCLA Law Review 14:458. 
(January, 1967) 
1 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
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public library. He contended that freedom of speech does not 
allow one to use public or private property as a vehicle of 
protest. Justice Black virtually admitted that the evidence 
substantiated the practice of segregation but he felt that 
the Black youths should not have engaged in a protest at a 
public place like the public library. Justice Black resorted 
to finding a technical excuse to avoid facing the real con¬ 
stitutional rights of the Black man. 
In another important case Justice Black again used 
technical institutional evasive techniques to avoid facing 
the real issues. This case was Adderly v. Florida♦ J In 
this case Justice Black wrote the Court opinion. This case 
dealt with a group of college students who were convicted 
for demonstrating at a public jail. The petitioners argued 
that the Florida trespass law was void for vagueness because 
it required trespass to take place with malicious intent. 
The petitioners were just protesting the segregation practices 
in the jail. Justice Black argued that the jail was the wrong 
place to protest for this was restrictive property. 
In addition, the petitioners argued that the petty 
criminal stature could not be used to violate minorities con¬ 
stitutional rights. Again Justice Black was blatantly eva¬ 
sive with the rights of Black people. He said this argument 
by the petitioner may be true but this point of view would 
not help the Court decide the case. In compliance with his 
technical evasive techniques Justice Black asserted that 
nothing in the Constitution could prevent Florida from en¬ 
forcing its trespass stature. Moreover, Justice Black con¬ 
tended that people do not have a right to propagandize their 
position whenever and wherever they please. 
13 
385 ÏÏ.S. 59 (1966). 
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This position professed by Justice Black does not 
follow the position on free speech stated by Justice Black 
prior to 1964. Justice Black was a leader prior to 1964 in 
this area of civil liberties. One should note that during 
the earlier cases, the active demonstrations by Blacks for 
their constitutional rights were not at issue. Prior to 
1964 Justice Black had great contempt for any official en¬ 
croachment upon the freedom of expression, and he was noted 
for his ability to discern and condemn formalistic distinc¬ 
tion by which legislation sought to emasculate basic consti¬ 
tutional protections. Justice Black had gained the reputa¬ 
tion for going to bat for the protection of the rights of 
unpopular dissenters. He contended, then, that an individual 
had an absolute right to disagree. Justice Black said in 
Barenblatt v. U. S. that government did not have a right to 
curtail any 14th amendment guarantees. ^ 
Against this background of being the great defender 
of the rights of the dissenters, Justice Black now asserts 
a position of being the great defender of the status quo. 
This was evident in Bell v. Maryland when he asserted that 
the law should protect the property owner over against the 
right of individuals to life and liberty. This was oppo¬ 
site to the view he took in Marsh v. Alabama. It is possi¬ 
ble that this shift from defending personal to property rights 
may have been due to the fact that the rights of Blacks were 
an issue in the Bell case and not in the Marsh case. 
Another case which points out this shift is Brown v. 
Louisiana. In this case Justice Black in a dissenting opinion 
said: 
I am deeply troubled with the fear that powerful private 
groups throughout the nation will read the court's ac¬ 
tion, as I do - that is as granting them a license to 
invade the tranquility and beauty of our libraries when- 
14 Peter Donnici, "Protection of the Minorities: Mr. 
Justice Hugo Black,” University of Missouri at Kansas City 
Law Review 32: 283-285^ Summer 1964. 
40 
ever they have quarrel with some state policy which 
may or may not exist. It is an unhappy circumstance 
in my judgment that the group, which more than any 
other has needed a government of equal laws and equal 
justice, is now encouraged to believe that the best 
way for it to advance its cause, which is a worthy 
one, is by taking the law into its own hands from 
place to place to place and from time to time.'5 
Justice Black seems to think that the Black man has a 
right to want to advance his status in society. Yet he felt 
that a public library which is a "place dedicated to guilt, 
to knowledge and to beauty," is not the place for the Black 
man to assert his rights. Justice Black did not want to deal 
with the fact that the state support of a segregated library 
is contrary to the dictates of the 14th Amendment. Again 
Justice Black seems to find it necessary to support the li¬ 
brary as if it were a sacred place over against the rights 
of Black people. This position is evident also in the Adderly 
v. Florida case. In the Court opinion Justice Black said this 
case differed from other rights protest cases because the pro¬ 
perty involved was a jailhouse yard, where security was im¬ 
portant. In upholding the demonstrators conviction Justice 
Black said: "The state, no less than a private owner of pro¬ 
perty has power to preserve the property under its control 
for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.it is evi¬ 
dent that Justice Black found it necessary to support property 
rights. From the facts of this case it was apparently clear 
that the state of Florida through its action in supporting a 
segregated jail was not dedicated to the lawful support of 
all its citizens. Justice Black seemed to have been concerned 
with sending out warnings to future Black protestors rather 
than dedicating himself to his constitutional duty to stamp 
15383 U.S. 131. 
16385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
41 
out all of the state vestiges of support of racism , or 
second class citizenship. If this was done Justice Black 
would have been instrumental in making Black demonstrations 
a post script in history. 
Attention should now he given to seeing how the Su¬ 
preme Court as an institution has used to restrain the Black 
man from achieving his just rights before the law, has been 
through Judicial restraint. This is also true of Justice 
Black as an individual. He said in his recent book, A Con¬ 
stitutional Faith, that: 
The cornerstone of ray constitutional faith is the be¬ 
lief that the Constitution is designed to prevent put¬ 
ting too much uncontrollable power in the hands of any 
one or more public officials. I do not subscribe to 
look at the interpretation of the due process clause 
which allows judges, especially justices of the United 
States Supreme Court, to hold unconstitutional laws 
they do not like . . . Judges may abuse power not be¬ 
cause they are corrupt but honestly desire to prevent 
national disaster . . . Such honest beliefs may reflect 
human hostility to change. Other judges with honest 
beliefs change imperatives, take it upon themselves to 
make changes which Congress alone has legislative power 
to make. I strongly believe that the public welfare 
demands that constitutional cases must be decided accord¬ 
ing to terms of our Constitution itself, not according 
to judges' views of fairness, reasonableness, or justice. 
Because of my ultimate faith in the people and their 
representatives, I have no fear of constitutional amend¬ 
ments properly adopted but I do fear the rewriting of 
the Constitution by judges under the guise of interpre¬ 
tation. ' 7 
Justice Black seemed to believe that the Supreme Court 
should not make law. This is the responsibility given Congress. 
Justice Black stressed the fact that the public welfare demands 
that the constitutional issues must be decided in the light of 
the Constitution and not according to the views of the judges. 
17 
H. Black, Constitutional Faith (New York: 
Knopf Press, 1968, pp. 14-23•) 
Alfred 
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In addition, tie believes in the right to expand the Constitu¬ 
tion by the amendment method. Even though he holds these 
views he seems to be reluctant to give justice to the original 
intent of the Civil War Amendments. These amendments were de¬ 
signed to fill the gap between being a Black slave and a full 
and equal citizen in America. Jacobus TenBroek has presented 
a well documented account of the anti-slavery origins of the 
1 ft 
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black does not adhere to the 
position that the Civil War Amendments were designed to change 
the relationship of the Black man to the Constitution. The 
new relationship committed the federal government to protect 
the Black man's rights of equality.19 jn addition, in regard 
to the Black man Justice Black has not fully grasped the nature 
of the legal system in the South. Leon Freedman wrote a book 
about Southern justice in 1965. He repeatedly stressed the 
point that the judicial system in the South has not been repre¬ 
sentative of the Black Americans' rights. Even though the 
Black man as a racial group comprise a very significant per¬ 
centage of the populace in the South, the law has played an 
active role in denying the Black man his constitutional rights.20 
In some recent cases the opinions of Justice Black have 
sounded like a states right judge in the South. In a dissent¬ 
ing opinion in South Carolina v. Katzenbach Justice Black said: 
One of the most basic premises upon which our structure 
of government was founded was that the Federal govern¬ 
ment was to have certain specific and limitated powers 
and no others, and all other power was to be reserved 
either to the states respectively or to the people. 
Certainly if all the provisions of our Constitution 
which limit the power of the Federal government and re¬ 
serve other power to the states are to mean anything 
they mean at least that the states have power to pass 
laws and amend their Constitution without first sending 
18 
Jacobus TenBroek, Equal Under Law (New York: Collier 
Books, 1965), pp 234-259 
19Ibid., pp. 235-238. 
20 
Leon Freedman, ed., Southern Justice (New York: 
Pantheon Book, 1965), pp. 187-188. 
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their officials hundreds of miles to Washington to beg 
federal authority to approve them.21 
In this case Justice Black used the common arguments 
of Southerners who believed the federal government was over¬ 
stepping its powers in supporting Black people. This case 
centered around the efforts of the State of South Carolina 
trying to evade complying the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Appar¬ 
ently Justice Black believed it was his duty to support the 
position of South Carolina rather than support the Congres¬ 
sional effort to eliminate a racial evil in our society. 
Justice Black also followed this line of thought in 
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Education. This case dealt 
with determining whether or not the use of a poll tax as an 
electoral standard in a state election violates the Equal Pro¬ 
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court con¬ 
cluded that it was unconstitutional. However, Justice Black 
looked at the case differently. In his dissent Justice Black 
said: 
It should be pointed out at once that the court decision 
is to no extent based on a finding that the Virginia law 
as written or as applied is being used as a device or 
mechanism to deny Negro citizens of Virginia the right 
to vote on account of their color. If the record could 
support a finding that the law as written or applied has 
such an effect the law would of course be unconstitutional. 
The mere fact that a law results in treating some group 
differently from others does not, automatically amount 
to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. To bar 
a state from drawing any distinction in the application 
of it would paralyze the regulatory power of legislation 
bodies.22 
Justice Black has been regarded as a great student of 
history. Yet he seems to forget the history behind the southern 
states original intention of drawing up a poll tax. He seems 
to want to protect the rights of the states in making distinc¬ 
tions in the use of the law. On the one hand, he claims to 
want to support the 14th and 15th Amendments, then on the other 
21383 U.S. 301. 
22383 U.S. 663. 
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hand he seems to want to protect the rights of the southern 
states. 
This was the same man who has manifested a great 
interest in following the rule of law. He had tried to search 
for simplicity and clarity in the law. Apparently, Justice 
Black had overlooked the rights of Black people in his effort 
to find simplicity in the law. Charles Price said in his ar¬ 
ticle about Justice Black that Justice Black believed that the 
Constitution must be interpreted in the light of contemporary 
problems.^3 in Brown v. Board of Education, Justice Black was 
a strong backer of a forwarding looking Court, not a Court 
trying to curtail the use of the Constitution. 
If Justice Black really believed in the court interpre¬ 
ting the Constitution in the light of contemporary situations, 
then his actions in recent cases do not support this view. 
There are several established rules of law which he has neg¬ 
lected to use to help the Black man receive equal justice be¬ 
fore the law. He has not accepted the fact that section 5 of 
the 14th Amendment was designed to act as a sword to stamp out 
the badge of servitude in American law. This section gives 
Congress the right to pass legislation that would be necessarily 
and properly brought about in the transformation of law and cus¬ 
toms in America to make a reality of the American creed which 
was designed for all citizens. 
In addition the color of law statutes were designed to 
keep law officials from depriving Blacks of their rights. In 
the United States codes 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1965) an old law pro¬ 
vided that a suit could be filed against persons who under 
color of law or custom of any state causes any citizen of the 
United States to be deprived of any rights and privileges or 
immunities secured by the Constitution. Justice Black seems 
2?A. E. Howard, "Mr. Justice Black: The Negro Protest 
Movement and Rule of Law" 53 Virginia Law Review 1070 (June 1967) 
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to have forgotten this statute in the Adderly and Brown v. 
Louisiana decisions. One could also utilize another Federal 
civil war statute, 42 U.S.C. 1985 (1968 ed). This provision 
deals with a conspiracy to deprive a citizen of his rights. 
In order for action to be taken under the color of law pro¬ 
vision within the meaning of section 1983 and 1985 there must 
be misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made 
possible only because wrongdoers are clothed with authority 
of the state. Justice Black feels judicial restraint is essen¬ 
tial for the general welfare of society. He has often said a 
justice should not avoid constitutional questions, but he him¬ 
self tended to avoid them in finding a just solution to the 
problems in Brown v. Louisiana and in Adderly v. Florida. 
These are only two of many cases in which he failed to follow 
his well established principles of law. 
Now attention should be given to a breakdown of the 
voting patterns of Justice Black in the area of juries, public 
accommodations, free speech, voting, trials, housing, family 
relations and education. Justice Black has tended to be more 
inclined to vote for Black people in the area of education, 
housing, family relations, but he has tended not to vote in 
favor of Blacks in the other areas of study. From his over¬ 
all voting record he has tended to vote in favor of Blacks 
about half the times he has voted. Thus, one could conclude 
that Justice Black has tended to vote against the Black man 
in some of the areas, like free speech, and court procedures, 
that he had in the past been a strong advocate. From the chart 
it appears that he voted against the Black man more in 1966 
than in any other period. From the evidence uncovered in this 
study, it was difficult to determine how Black will vote in 
the future, but it's more than likely he will continue to lean 
toward a more conservative point of view. One could conclude 
from Justice Black's voting chart that he tended to vote pro- 
2*A Constitutional Faith. P. 15 
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gressively against Black people in varying degrees, depending 
upon the subject area. This tendency started in 1964. 
TABLE 2 
VOTING RECORD OE JUSTICE BLACK IN CASES INVOLVING 
BLACK PEOPLE IN THIS STUDY 
(TERMS) 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Total i° 
Pro Con Pro Con Pro Con Pro Con Pro Con Pro Con Pro Con 
Education 2 0 1 0 2 0 5 0 100 0 
Recreation 0 3 0 3 0 100 
Public 
Accommodation 2 4 1 0 1 0 4 4 50 50 
Free 
Expression 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 2 5 29 71 
Voting and 
Representation 1 0 3 0 1 2 5 2 71 29 
Housing 0 1 1 0 1 1 50 50 
Juries 0 1 2 0 2 1 33 67 
Trials 2 2 0 1 2 1 4 4 50 50 
Family Relation 1 0 1 0 2 0 100 0 
Totals 6 4 5 2 3 9 4 3 7 2 25 20 55 45 
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Up until this point in this study the majority of the 
cases have not been analyzed. Attention has been given to 
those cases which dealth with the constitutionality of Con¬ 
gressional Civil rights acts. Moreover, several of the cases 
were discussed in the analyses of opinions of Justice Black. 
Consequently, attention should now be given to an analysis of 
a critical view of the Supreme Court by Lewis Steel. This 
chapter also served as a vehicle by which this writer purpor¬ 
ted to analyze the significant cases not yet discussed in 
this paper. 
CHAPTER V 
LEWIS STEEL AND THE SUPREME COURT 
On October 13» 1968, an article appeared in The Hew 
York Times magazine which threatened to destroy the long 
courtship between the national Association for the Advance¬ 
ment of Colored People and the United States Supreme Court. 
This article was written by Mr. Lewis M. Steel, a white 
Associate Counsel of the NAACP. The thesis of this article 
was that the Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren had never 
committed itself to a society based upon principles of abso¬ 
lute equality. In support of this thesis Mr. Steel gave an 
overview of the history of the relationship between the 
Supreme Court and the Black man. According to Mr. Steel's 
argument other institutions besides the Supreme Court initi¬ 
ated the change in public policy toward race relations prior 
to the famous Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka decision. 
For Mr. Steel's critical view of the Supreme Court he was 
fired by the Board of Directors of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People. 
Since Mr. Steel's argument is related to the position 
taken in this paper, the Steel thesis will be analyzed in 
terms of the Supreme Court decisions from 1964 to 1968. The 
49 
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frame of reference that Mr. Steel used was taken from his 
support of the view of the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders that our nation is moving toward two socie¬ 
ties, one black, one white - separate and unequal. This 
frame of reference by Mr. Steel was not supported in his 
historical sketch of the Supreme Court and the Black man. 
This contradiction, in philosophy and fact is really part of 
the great American Dilemma. There has never been a truly 
United American society. 
In the article Mr. Steel stressed the point that the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision was influenced by the 
changes in action of other agencies and events in American 
society. He noted the presidential executive order forbid¬ 
ding racial discrimination, by the recipients of government 
contracts and the detrimental effect of racism as shown by 
the practice of racism in Nazis Germany. The writer of the 
article apparently failed to realize that the Supreme Court 
is a political agency or institution which is influenced by 
the environment. The Supreme Court has historically been 
guided by societal forces. The Separate But Equal doctrine, 
the Substantive Due Process, and Dual Federalism have per¬ 
mitted a few to control the economy until the New Deal revo¬ 
lution. The Great Depression and the tyranny of the Nazis 
racism had its impact on the Supreme Court. The Court be¬ 
gan in 1937 to move in another direction toward the Brown 
case of 1954. "The 1954 decisions simply reflected the 
conscience of their day as surely as Plessy reflects the 
spirit of the 1890's.""' 
The Supreme Court is a nine member delegation of ap¬ 
pointed persons. They are selected by the President of the 
United States and are confirmed for office by the United 
1 
Wallace Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfurter: 
Conflict in the Court (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1961), pp. 75-76. 
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States Senate. Historically the appointment of a person has 
been a political payoff. Generally, the President appoints 
persons to the Supreme Court who tend to reflect his politi- 
2 
cal philosophy. The members of the Court up until 1967 were 
white males. The personal contact of the members of the Court 
with Black people was very limited. In 1967 a Black man 
joined the Court--Mr. Thurgood Marshall. When one joins the 
Court, he does not forget his political and social orienta¬ 
tion. The Supreme Court is an institution which tends to 
rely on certain historical guidelines which in race relations 
has tended to be detrimental to the realization of equal 
rights for Blacks in the United States. These basic guide¬ 
lines were spelled out by Justice Brandeis in his concur¬ 
rence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority. He said 
that: 
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality 
of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary proceed¬ 
ing. 
2. The Court will not anticipate a question of consti¬ 
tutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding 
it. 
3- The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional 
law broader than is required by the precise facts to 
which it is to be applied. 
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional ques¬ 
tion, although properly presented by the record, if 
there is also present some other ground upon which 
the case may be disposed of. 
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a sta¬ 
tute upon complaint of one who fails to show that 
he is injured by its operation. 
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality 
of a statute at the instance of one who has availed 
himself of its benefits. 
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn 
in question, and even if a serious doubt of consti¬ 
tutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle 
that this court will first ascertain whether a con¬ 
struction of the statute is fairly possible by which 
the question may be avoided.5 
2Sidney Ulmer, "Public Office in the Social Background 
of the Supreme Court Justices." 21 American Journal of Eco¬ 
nomics and Sociology 57 (1962). 
^Richard Johnson, The Dynamics of Compliance (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1967), pp. 30-31- 
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The majority of the Court had not always followed the 
dictates of these basic principles. Since the Justices of 
the Court are men with independent minds and diversified back 
grounds who interpret the Constitution in terms of their ex¬ 
periences, their interpretation of the social order and of re 
4 
lated practical matters are reflected in their judgment. 
Thus it is not too surprising that the Court from 1964-1968 
did not go as far as it could to bring about full equality 
for Blacks, in the light of the social status and background 
of the members of the Court. 
Yet, one cannot say that the Supreme Court has not 
made progress in American race relation The extent of the 
progress had not been as great as it could have been. This 
Mr. Steel pointed out the gradual changes in the Court's 
opinions during this period to the extent that the individual 
justices have been influenced by the urban riots and the 
Black Power movement. 
Now attention should be given to an analysis of the 
significant cases mentioned by Steel and to other cases of 
this period pertinent to the Steel analysis. One of the 
main criticisms of the Warren Court stems from the position 
5 
taken by the court in Swain v. Alabama. This was a pivotal 
case in jury selection. Robert Swain, a 19-year-old Negro 
indicted and sentenced to death in Talladega County for the 
alleged rape of a 17-year-old white girl. In the Court's 
opinion, Justice White carefully pointed out that Blacks 
^Sidney Ulmer, "The Analysis of Behavior Pattern on 
the United States Supreme Court," 22 Journal of Politics, 
1960, pp. 629-638. 
5380 U.S. 202 (1966). 
£ 
The Swain case dealt with Alabama's unusual method 
of jury selection. The 12 jurors for a case are selected 
from a list of 75 persons. In order to come up with the 12 
persons, Alabama requires that the defense has a right to 
strike off for no reason two veniremen and the prosecutor 
one. This process is continued until 12 jurors are left. 
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were not totally excluded from either the grand or petit jury 
panel. This point according to Justice White distinguished 
this case from Morris v. Alabama7 and Patton v. Miss.7 8 How¬ 
ever, another device was used to discriminate against the dé¬ 
fendent. The prosecutor used the peremptory challenge to ex¬ 
clude Blacks from the final juries. The evidence showed that 
the prosecutor would make it a policy to exclude Blacks by 
this method. Justice White said that this practice by the 
prosecutor may be unconstitutional, but there is not enough 
evidence to support this claim in this case. To the majority 
of the Court would not strike down this Alabama system of 
jury selection, for on its face the Court said it was consti¬ 
tutional. It is significant to note that this system was 
initiated in 1909. Even though the Black man seems to have 
lost ground in the struggle for a fair and just jury system 
in America, this court seems to have seen the value of future 
investigation of this case. The Court appeared to request 
that more evidence be presented to substantiate the view that 
the prosecutor had systematically excluded Black jurors by 
using the preemptory exemption method.9 * 11 Again the Court tend¬ 
ed to utilize its standing rules of operations to evade its 
responsibility. The Court has also made some significant 
progress in the area of jury selection. It has struck down 
several cases of clar prima facie discrimination. This was 
true in Whitus v. Georgia,and in Coleman v. Alabama.^1 
The Supreme Court had laid down the rule that there must not 
be a purposeful and systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury 
panels. The Court had not dealt with the issue that Blacks 
7294 TJ.S. 587 (1935). 
8332 U.S. 463 (1947). 
9380 U.S. 202. 
1°385 U.S. 545. 
11389 U.S. 22. 
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should he represented on juries when defenders are Black. 
In fact, the Supreme Court refused to review a significant 
Court of Appeals decision in 1965. In this case involving 
a Negro, the basic constitutional question held that delib¬ 
erate inclusion of Negroes offends the equal-protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 one cannot really say why the 
Court refused to consider this significant case for the Su¬ 
preme Court does not say why it refuses to hear certain cases 
and accept other cases. 
In the Steel review of the Warren Court, he did not 
do justice to the fact that this Court did revive the Civil 
War Amendments. The Warren Court may not have gone as far 
as it could have in its race relations cases, but it did make 
some gains for the Black man. The significant cases invol- 
1 3 
ving Civil War legislation were United States v. Guest, 
United States v. Johnson,United States v. Price,^5 and 
Jones v. Mayer. 
In looking at these cases, one could combine United 
States v. Guest, United States v. Johnson and United States 
v. Price for they dealt with 18 U.S.C. 241 and 18 U.S.C. 242. 
In order to understand the significance of these cases one 
must understand the Civil War legislation in question. They 
were as follows: 
18 U.S.C. 241: If two or more persons conspire to in¬ 
jure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in 
the free exercise or enjoyment of any rights or privi¬ 
leges secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the 
^loren Miller, The Petitioner (New York: Meridan 
Books, 1966), pp. 290-291. 
13383 U.S. 745. 
H36 U.S.L. Week 4289- 
15383 U.S. 787. 
16 
36 U.S.L. Week 4461. 
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United States, or because of his having so exercised 
the same or if two or more persons go in disguise with 
intent to prevent or hinder a citizen's free exercise 
or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him 
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, they 
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not 
more than ten years or both. (Derived from the Act of 
May 31, 1870).“7 
18 U.S.C. 242: Whoever, under color of any law, statute, 
ordinance regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any 
inhabitants ... to the deprivation of any rights, pri¬ 
vileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Con¬ 
stitution or laws of the United States or to different 
punishment, pains or penalties, on account of such an in¬ 
habitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or 
race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizen 
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not 
more than one year or both (Derived from the Act of 
April 9, 1866).18 
A significant case which the Court considered was 
1 Q 
United States v. Price♦ Deputy Sheriff Cecil Price detained 
three Civil Rights Workers--Michael Henry Schverner, James 
Chaney, and Andrew Goodman. He later conspired with 18 other 
persons with intent release them from custody and then drove 
them to a designated place where they were beaten and later 
killed. The significant question raised was whether 18 U.S.C. 
241 and 18 U.S.C. 242 make criminal the conduct for which the 
individual was indicted. The significant rule of law which 
the court derived was that the 18 U.S.C. 241 and 18 U.S.C. 
242 could also apply to private citizens if it could be shown 
that they acted with state official then they act under color 
20 
of law. This was a victory for the Black man. 
The next case was United States v. Guest. This case 
grew out of a situation where a Black man was killed on a 
17 
Milton Konvitz, 






383 U.S. 787. 
383 U.S. 787. 
383 U.S. 745- 
A Century of Civil Rights 
, 1961), p. 68. 
(New York: 
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Georgia highway. He was going hack to Washington, D. G. after 
finishing a tour of military duty at Fort Benning, Georgia. 
The Supreme Court revised the District Court's view that the 
Black man did not have a right to travel. The Supreme Court 
said that the constitutional right to travel from one state 
to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other in¬ 
strumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies 
a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. 
In addition the Supreme Court said to he covered under this 
act, one must prove a specific intent to interfere with the 
federal right of an individual. Moreover, the defendant is 
22 entitled to have the jury instructed in these matters. 
Again the Court under a partial victory for the Black man. 
In Mr. Steel's analysis of the Court he failed to 
mention the fact that a Black man had been elevated to the 
Supreme Court He was Thurgood Marshall. The very presence 
of a Black man on the Court could prove to he a great asset 
to the legal struggle for justice for the Black man. In an 
article about Justice Marshall, Professor Ronald Davenport 
said Justice Marshall probably made the second greatest con¬ 
tributions to American constitutional law. He was second to 
Chief Justice John Marshall. His place in history as a con¬ 
stitutional advocate is assured. Yet, one cannot really 
tell what place he will have as a Supreme Court Justice. 
Since Mr. Marshall was appointed to Court from the position 
as Solicitor General, he was forced to disqualify himself in 
many cases.^3 jn fact out of 257 cases before the Court in 
1967 Justice Marshall did not participate in 83 cases.^ 
22383 U.S. 745- 
23 
Ronald Davenport, "The Second Justice Marshall," 
7 Duquesne Law Review 44 (1968). 
24 
Percival Jackson, Dissent in the Supreme Court 
(Norman: University Oklahoma Press, 19^8,) p. 512. 
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The significance of Justice Marshall on the Court cannot he 
really understood until after he had been on the court for a 
longer period of time. One can say that the addition of Jus¬ 
tice Marshall does not destroy Mr. Steel's basic position, 
but it does put a dent in his overall position. 
There are several other cases which should be considered 
in dealing with this thesis. These cases tend to support the 
view that the Court has moved farther in some areas than Mr. 
Steel's thesis would support. 
A significant case was Green v. County School Board. 
This case dealt with the use of a freedom of choice plan in 
order to achieve integration. In the Court opinion Justice 
Brennan said: 
In determining whether the respondent school board met 
the command of Brown I and Brown II by adopting its 
freedom of choice plan, it is relevant that this first 
step did not come until some 11 years after Brown II 
directed the making of a prompt and reasonable start. 
This deliberate perpetuation of the unconstitutional 
dual system can only have compounded the harm of such 
a system. Such delays are no longer tolerable for the 
governing constitutional principles no longer bear the 
imprint of newly enunciated doctrine. The time for 
mere deliberate speed has run out . . . The burden on 
a school board today is to come forward with a plan 
that promises realistically to work and promises realis¬ 
tically to work now.25 
This case shows the Court was ready to be very force¬ 
ful in the field of education. The forcefulness of the Su¬ 
preme Court was evident in other areas. The Court said in 
2 c 
Reitman v. MuIkey that a state sponsored type of restric¬ 
tive covenant was unconstitutional. This Court also took a 
very forward looking step in the area of family relations. 
27 In Loving v. Virginia the Court said that the Virginia mis- 
25391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
26387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
27388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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cegenation statute which prevents marriage between persons 
solely on the basis of their racial classification violates 
the equal protection and the due process clause of the 14th 
Amendment. This action by the Court seems to indicate that 
the Court has made some effort toward realization of a society 
of equals. In addition the Jones v. Mayer^8 case which was 
discussed in chapter three tends to discredit the Steel the¬ 
sis to a degree. 
There were other decisions rendered by the Court from 
1964 to 1968 which support the view that the Court has made 
some effort in bringing about equality in American society. 
During this period under consideration, the Supreme 
Court rendered some significant decisions in the area of 
discriminatory state action. A very significant case was 
Evans v. Newton.^9 This case dealt with the will of a United 
States Senator from Georgia, which was probated in 1911 and 
called for the city of Macon, Georgia, to act as trustee of 
a park for white people only. The city kept the part segre¬ 
gated for many years, then the part was integrated. As a 
result of this action taken by the city, a suit was filed to 
get the city to desegregate the park. In the meantime the 
city turned the park officially over to some private persons. 
When this case reached the Supreme Court, it ruled that a 
will which leaves private property to the public or to just 
white people cannot be enforced by the court for such action 
50 
is unconstitutionally state action. 
Another important case which the Warren Court con- 
51 sidered was Reitman v. Mulkey. This case dealt with an 
amendment to the Constitution of the state of California 
28392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
29382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
30 
In Evans v. Abney (Decided January 26, 1970) Justice 
Berger's Court reversed this major decision of the Warren 
Court. 
31 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
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which was based on the statewide ballot in 1964. The amend¬ 
ment was called Proposition 14 which was designed to repeal 
the current state laws against discrimination in housing and 
to bar future action of the state in the area. The voters 
of California passed the amendment and it was added to the 
State Constitution as Section 26 of Article 1. Mr. and 
Mrs. Neil Reitman, a Black couple and apartment owner Lincoln 
Mulkey declaring he had refused to rent them an apartment be¬ 
cause they were Black. This case passed through a California 
trial court, then to the State Supreme Court and finally to 
the United States Supreme Court. Then, the court of last 
resort considered the constitutionality of Proposition 14. 
In the court's opinion by Justice White the court ruled that 
the evidence showed that Proposition 14 was designed to re¬ 
peal all state laws that "bore on the right of private sel¬ 
lers." In addition it was designed to forestall future state 
action that might circumscribe this right. Such action by 
the state would result in the state taking a neutral posi¬ 
tion with respect to private racial discriminations. The 
California State Supreme Court held that Article 1, Section 26 
of the California Constitution violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment. The United States Supreme Court 
agreed with the court's decision. 
In United States v. Johnson the court made an attempt 
to fill a vacancy in the famous 1964 Civil Rights Act. The 
question raised in this case was whether conspiracies by hood¬ 
lums to assault Blacks for exercising their rights of equal 
public accommodations under Section 201 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 are subject only to a Civil suit injunction as 
provided by paragraph 204 of the Act. In addition the ques¬ 
tion was considered whether they are also subject to criminal 
32 
390 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 241. The court's opinion hy Jus¬ 
tice Douglas expressed the views of five members of the court 
said that the provisions of Section 207(b) of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 made the remedies provided in the Public Accommo¬ 
dations part of the Act the exclusive means of enforcing rights 
based on such part does not preclude a criminal prosecution 
of the defendants under 18 U.S.C. 241, since the exclusive re¬ 
medy provision applies only to the enforcement of substantive 
rights of public accommodations against proprietors and owners, 
and does not purport to deal with outsiders who use violence 
against those who assert their rights under the act. In the 
area of voting, the Supreme Court decided in Harper v. Virginia 
State Board of Elections-^ that the $1.50 poll tax imposed 
on citizens desiring to vote in state elections violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Moreover, one 
should note also that the court made a significant decision 
in the area of welfare rights. In King v. Smith,54- the court 
ruled that destitute children who are fatherless cannot be 
flatly denied federal financial assistance on the transparent 
fiction that they have a substitute father. During this 
period the court took forward looking position on the rights 
of persons who are on trial for a crime. In Bumper v. North 
Carolina^ -the court said that evidence obtained, from a home 
to be used against a defendant must be obtained by a search 
warrant or by the consent of the owner of the house. In 
■zf. 
another decision the court said in Duncan v. Louisiana-^ that 
a person has a right to a jury trial for a criminal offense 
which carries punishment for as much as two years confinement. 
55383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
54392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
35391 U.S. 543 (I960). 
36 
391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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A very important point must be reaffirmed here, is the fact 
that all of the forementioned cases dealth with Black people. 
In the light of this fact and the nature of the decisions 
rendered in this chapter, one must conclude that the Steel 
thesis tends to overstate the facts. It is true that the 
Warren Court did not go as far as it could to bring to light 
true equality, some meaningful advancements have been made 
by this Court. The real significance of these advancements 
can only be judged by future historians. 
CONCLUSION'S 
The overall purpose of this study was to investigate 
the last five terms of the Warren Court. This research 
covered the 1964 Supreme Court term through the 1968 Supreme 
Court term. The primary focus of this study was upon the 
role the Supreme Court Justices played in forty-six cases 
heard during the terms of this study. In order to obtain a 
clearer picture of attitudes of the individual Justice to¬ 
ward the Black man, the forty-six cases were analyzed. These 
cases were carefully scrutinized to determine the voting pat¬ 
terns of the individual Justices in regard to various types 
of cases involving Black people. The criteria used to deter¬ 
mine whether the Justices voted pro-Black was to see if the 
Justice accepted the position of the Black litigants in various 
types of cases. If the Justices voted against the position 
of the Black litigants then, this study dealt with the 
following areas: 
(a) Education; (b) Family Relations; (c) Public Accommoda¬ 
tions; (d) Recreational Facilities; (e) Free Speech; (f) Hous¬ 
ing; (g) Juries; (h) Trials; (i) Voting: (j) Representation. 
From this frame of reference the charts for the study were 
compiled. 
In order to analyze the cases and to really consider 
62 
63 
the inner mechanism of the Supreme Court it was necessary to 
formulate a widely accepted format of analysis. This format 
included a biographic melodrama of the Supreme Court members 
in order to arrive at the conclusion that the members of the 
Court tend to be members of the upper stratas of American 
society. Moreover, it was also noted that the President of 
the United States tended to appoint a person to fill a vacan¬ 
cy on the Court in order to pay off a political debt. The 
appointee tended to also reflect the same political tempera¬ 
ment of the President. 
Prom the investigation into the biographies of the 
Justices of the Court, it was noted that there were two judi¬ 
cial changes during the period of this study. The first 
change in the composition of the court occurred in 1965. 
Justice Arthur Goldberg, a Jew, resigned from the Supreme 
Court in order to become the United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations. He was replaced by Abe Portas, who was also 
a Jew. The second change in the personnel occurred in 1967. 
Justice Tom Clark retired from the Court. He was replaced 
by the first Black man to be appointed to the Court. This 
was the Solicitor General of the United States Thurgood Mar¬ 
shall. Prior to his appointment as Solicitor General Mr. 
Marshall had gained world wide recognition for his contribu¬ 
tion to constitutional law as Chief Counsel for the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. These 
personnel changes on the Court tended to help the cause of 
Black people. 
There were other important points found in this study. 
The Supreme Court during the period of this study considered 
more cases involving Civil Rights than in any other comparable 
period in the Court's history. In addition the Court resur¬ 
rected several pieces of Civil Rights legislation which had 
passed Congress shortly after the Civil War. These acts were 
generally used to render some favorable decisions tor the 
Black man. Moreover one should also note that special con- 
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sidération was given to analyzing the role the Supreme Court 
played in determining the legality of the Civil Rights Acts 
passed during the period of this study. 
The voting records of the Justices in this study 
brought to light some interesting facts. The study pointed 
out the facts that Justices Goldberg, Marshall and Portas 
seem to always vote in favor of Black people. Yet, their 
voting records were a little misleading. Justice Marshall 
participated in only eleven per cent of the forty-six cases 
while Justices Goldberg and Portas participated in thirty- 
three per cent and sixty-three per cent respectively. On 
the other hand, the other Justices, (except Justice Clark 
who participated in thirty-seven cases) participated in at 
least forty-five of the forty-six cases. 
It was also significant to note that Justice Thurgood 
Marshall was the first Black man to be selected to join the 
Supreme Court. Prior to his appointment in 1967 he was the 
United States Solicitor General. Due to the fact Mr. Mar¬ 
shall only joined the Court in 1967 and due to his involve¬ 
ment in many cases being heard by the Supreme Court in the 
1967 and 1968 terms he felt it necessary to disqualify him¬ 
self. Due to his limited involvement on the Court the true 
significance of a Black man on the Court could not yet be 
adequately ascertained. 
The cases were divided into ten areas. They were the 
following: (a) Family relations; (b) Education; (c) Public 
accommodations; (d) Recreational facilities; (e) Pree Speech; 
(f) Housing; (g) Juries; (h) Trials; (i) Voting; (j) Repre¬ 
sentation. The Justices tended to vote favorably for the 
position of Black people in certain areas. Chief Justice 
Earl Warren generally voted in favor of the position of Black 
people. His overall pro-Black voting record was 96%. He 
only voted against the position of Black people in two cases. 
One case dealt with public accommodations and the other case 
dealt with free speech. 
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A great deal of attention was given to Justice Hugo 
Black. This was done for several reasons. He had tradition¬ 
ally been regarded as a strong supporter of the Constitutional 
claims of minority groups this was true prior to 1964. His 
position seemed to change beginning in 1964. Justice Black 
was the only Justice on the Court who seemed to alter his 
traditional position toward Black people. Thus, it was 
necessary to analyze the court opinions of Justice Black in 
order to see what areas did Justice Black alter his position 
toward Black people. From the study several noteworthy facts 
were discovered. Justice Black participated in 45 out of the 
46 cases. He tended to have an overall record of voting in 
favor of Black people in 55$ of the cases. He was more in¬ 
clined to vote in favor of Black people in cases involving 
education, voting, representation and family relations. On 
the other hand he was least inclined to vote in favor of 
Black people in cases dealing with free speech and recrea¬ 
tional facilities. 
Attention should now be given to Justice Douglas and 
Justice Clark. Justice Douglas had an overall record of vot¬ 
ing in favor of Black people in 96$ of the cases. He voted 
against Black people in a housing case and a public accommo¬ 
dation case. On the other hand Justice Clark participated 
in 37 of the 46 cases. He had an overall pro-Black voting 
record of 70$. He tended to vote against Black people in 
the areas of free speech and trials. 
The next two Justices to be considered were Justice 
Harlan and Justice Brennan. Justice Harlan participated in 
all of the cases. He tended to vote in favor of the posi¬ 
tion of Black people in only 41$ of the cases. He tended to 
only vote in favor of Black people in the areas of education, 
public accommodations, juries and representation. His voting 
record in favor of Black people in the other cases tended to 
range from fifty per cent to zero. On the other hand Justice 
Brennan had a better record than Justice Harlan. Justice 
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Brennan had an overall record of voting in favor of Black 
people in 88$ of the cases. The only area where there was a 
significant dissenting pattern against the position of Black 
people was in the area of public accommodations. 
The last Justices to be considered were Justices 
Stewart and Justice White. Justice Stewart participated in 
forty-five of the forty-six cases. He tended to vote in favor 
of Black people in nine out of the ten areas of study. His 
overall record of voting in favor of Black people was 71$. 
He voted against Black people in cases dealing with free 
speech. On the other hand, Justice White seemed to have a 
similar record. He voted in favor of Black people in 65$ of 
the forty-six cases. He tended to vote against the position 
of Black people in cases dealing with free speech and public 
accommodations. 
In the fifth chapter the writer reviewed a critique 
of the Supreme Court by lewis Steel. Until he was fired for 
his critique of the Supreme Court Mr. Steel was a member of 
the Legal staff of the National Association for the Advance¬ 
ment of Colored People. Mr. Steel contended in the article 
which appeared in the New York Times Magazine that the Su¬ 
preme Court has never dedicated itself to bringing about full 
equality for the Black man. The writer of this paper utilized 
this thesis of Mr. Steel as a vehicle to analyze the majority 
of the cases in this study, and to react to Steel's views in 
the light of the finding of this study. Thus, the study 
showed that the Supreme Court as a politically white insti¬ 
tution has made some steps forward toward the realization of 
equality, but it had not dedicated itself to the task as it 
should have. Consequently, there was a close correlation be¬ 
tween the position of Lewis Steel and the position of this 
writer. The future role the Supreme Court will take in race 
relations is uncertain. The fact that a Black man is a mem¬ 
ber of the Supreme Court could better influence the direc¬ 
tion that the Court will take in the future. 
APPENDIX 
The table which has been placed in this section of 
this paper is the voting tally sheet of the individual jus¬ 
tices of the Supreme Court from 1964-1968. This is a graphic 
record of 46 significant cases directly involving Black peo¬ 
ple. These cases dealt with various subjects. They repre¬ 
sented the area of Education, Public Accommodations, Trials, 
Free Speech, Voting, Representation, Housing, Juries and 
Family Relations. In each case that the Justices partici¬ 
pated, the cases were analyzed to see if the Justices voted 
favorably to blacks. The Justices who voted positively for 
black people are noted on the chart with a (+) sign. On 
the other hand, those Justices who voted in a particular 
case, voted against black people was noted on the chart with 
a (-) negative sign. The blank spaces indicate the Justices 
either did not participate or were not on the court when the 
case was decided. In addition the numbers on the chart 
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 3 
Warren + + + + + + + + + + 4* + + + 
Black 4* + + + + - 4- - - - + + + + 
Douglas + + + + + + + + 4- + 4- + 4- — + 
Clark + + + + + - + + + 4- + + + — + 
Harlan + 4* + + + - - - - - - - + + _ 
Brennan + + + + + - + + + + + + + + 
Stewart + + 4- + + - + + + - + + 4" + + 
White + + + + + - 4- - + - + + + — — 
Portas - + - + 
Goldberg + + + + + + 4- 4- + + + + 
Marshall 
Justices Case Numbers 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
Warren + + + 4* + + + 4- + + + + + + + + 
Black - — + + - -, - + - - - + _ + + 4- 
Douglas + + + + + + + + + 4* + + + + + + + 
Clark + — + — + - - - - - - — + + + 
Harlan - — + - + - - - + - - - - - 4- + + 
Brennan — + + + • + + + + + - + - + + + 
Stewart + - + - + - - + - - - + - + + + 
White + + + + + - - - + - - + - - + + + 
Portas + + 4* + + + + + + + + + 
Goldberg + + + + 
Marshall + 
Justices Case Numbers 
53 34 35 36 37 36 ! 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 
Warren + + + + + + + 4- + + + + + 
Black - + + + + + + + + - - + - + 
Douglas + + - - + + + + + + + 
Clark + - + - - + + 4- + + + + 
Harlan + - + + + + + + + + - 4- - • 
Brennan + + - - + + + + + + + + + 4* 
Stewart 4" + + + + - + + + - + - + 
White + + + + + + + + + + - + 
Portas + + + + 4- + + + + 




1. Griffin v. School Board 377 U.S. 294 (1964). 
2. Bradley v. School Board 382 U.S. 103 (1965). 
3. Rogers v. Paul 382 U.S. 198 (1965). 
4. Green v. County School Board 391 U.S. 430 (1965). 
5. Monroe v. Board of Commissioners 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
6. Greenwood v. Peacock 384 U.S. 808 (1966). 
7. Robinson v. Florida 378 U.S. 153 (1964). 
8. Bouie v. Columbia 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
9. Bell v. Maryland 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
10. Hamm v. Rock Hill 379 U.S. 306 (1964). 
11. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. 379 241 (1964). 
12. Katzenbach v. MeClung 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
13. Pierson v. Ray 386 uTs. 347 (1967). 
14. U. S. v. Johnson 390 U.S. 563 (1968). 
15. Griffin v. Maryland 378 U.S. 130 (1964). 
16. Evans v. Newton 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
17. Brown v. Louisiana 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
18. NAACP v. Alabama 377 U.S. 288 (1964). 
19. Dombrowski v. Pfister 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
20. Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
21. Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
22. Adderly v. Florida 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
23 NAACP v. Overstreet 384 U.S. 118 (1966). 
24- Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
25- Walker v. Birmingham 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
26. Cameron v. Johnson 390 U.S. 611 (1968). 
27- Reitman v. Mulkey 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
28. Jones v. Mayer 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
29. Swain v. Alabama 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
30. Whitus v. Georgia 385 U.S. 545 (1967). 
31. Coleman v. Alabama 389 U.S. 22 (1967). 
32. U. S. v. Price 383 U.S. 787 (1966). 
33- Sims v. Georgia 385 U.S. 538 (1967). 
34 Davis v. North Carolina 384 U.S. 737 (1966). 
35- Bumper v. North Carolina 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
36. Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
37. Le© I- Washington 390 U.S. 333 (i960). 
38. Georgia v. Rachel 384 U.S. 780 (1966). 
39. Harmon v. Forssenius 380 U.S. 528 (1965). 
40. Louisiana v. U. S. 380 U.S. 145 (1965). 
41. U. S. v. Mississippi 380 128 (1965). 
42. South Carolina v. Katzenbach 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
43. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
44. Bond v. Floyd 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
45. Lupper v. Arkansas 379 U.S. 306 (1964). 
46. King v. Smith 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Beard, Charles. The Supreme Court and the Constitution. 
Englewood Cliffs : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. 
Berger, Raoul. Congress v. The Supreme Court. Harvard 
Press, 1969. 
Bickel, Alexander. Politics and The Warren Court. Hew 
York: Harper & Row, 1965. 
Black, Charles. The Occasion of Justice. New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1963• 
Black, Hugo. A Constitutional Paith. New York: Alfred 
Knopf Press, 1968. 
Blaustein, Albert and Robert Zandiandi. Civil Rights and 
the American Negro. New York: Trident Press, 1968. 
Bozell, Brent. The Warren Revolution: Reflections on the 
Consensus Society. New Rochelle, New York, 1966. 
Emerson, Thomas and others, ed. Political and Civil Rights 
in the United States. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 
19W. 
Frank, John. The Warren Court. New York: Macmillan Co., 
1964. 
 . Mr. Justice Black: The Man and His Opinions. New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 1949. 
Greenberg, Jack. Race Relations and American Law. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1959. 
Jackson, Percival. Dissent in the Supreme Court. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 19&9. 
Johnson, Richard. The Dynamics of Compliance - Supreme Court 
Decisions from a New Perspective. Northwestern Uni- 
versity Press, 1967. 
70 
71 
Kalven, Harry. The Negro and the 1st Amendment. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1965. 
King, Donald and Quick, Charles, eds. legal Aspects of the 
Civil Rights Movement. Detroit: Wayne State Uni- 
versity Press, 1965. 
Mason, Alpheus. The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren. 
Louisiana State University Press, 1968. 
Mendelson, Wallace. Justices Black and Frankfurter. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1961. 
McCord, John, ed. With All Deliberate Speed. Chicago: The 
University of Illinois Press, 1969. 
Miller, Charles. The Supreme Court and the Uses of History. 
Howard University Press, 1969. 
Miller, Leon. The Petitioners: The Story of the Supreme 
Court of the United States and the Negro. New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1966. 
Murray, Pauli, ed. States' Laws on Race and Color. New 
York: Women's Division of Christian Service of the 
Methodist Church, 1951. 
Revolution in Civil Rights. Washington: Congressional 
Quarterly Service, 1968. 
Supreme Court Cases 
Adderly v. Plorida 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
Bell v. Maryland 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
Bond v. Floyd 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
Bouie v. Columbia 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
Bradley v. School Board 382 U.S. 103 (1965). 
Brown v. Louisiana 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
Bumper v. North Carolina 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
Cameron v. Johnson 390 U.S. 611 (1968). 
Coleman v. Alabama 389 U.S. 22 (1967). 
72 
Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
Davis v. North Carolina 384 U.S. 737 (1966) 
Dombrowski v. Pfister 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
Evans v. Newton 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
Georgia v. Rachel 384 U. S. 780 (1966). 
Green v. County School Board 391 U.S. 430 (1965). 
Greenwood v. Peacock 384 U.S. 808 (1966). 
Griffin v. Maryland 378 U.S. 130 (1964). 
Griffin v. School Board 377 U.S. 294 (1964). 
Hamm v. Rock Hill 379 U.S. 306 (1964). 
Harmon v. Eorssenius 380 U.S. 528 (1965). 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
Jones v. Mayer 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
Katzenbach v. McClung 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
King v. Smith 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
Lee v. Washington 390 U.S. 333 (1968). 
Louisiana v. United States 380 U.S. 145 (1965). 
Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
Lupper v. Arkansas 379 U.S. 306 (1964). 
Monroe v. Board of Commissioners 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
NAACP v. Alabama 377 U.S. 288 (1964). 
NAACP v. Overstreet 384 U.S. 118 (1966). 
Pierson v. Ray 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
73 
Re itman v. Mulkey 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
Robinson v. Florida 378 U.S. 153 (1964). 
Rogers v. Paul 382 U.S. 198 (1965). 
Sims v. Georgia 385 U.S. 538 (1967). 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
Swain v. Alabama 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
United States v. Johnson 390 U.S. 563 (1968). 
United States v. Miss. 380 U.S. 128 (1965). 
United States v. Price 383 U.S. 787 (1966). 
Walker v. Birmingham 388 U.S. 307 (1967)• 
Whitus v. Georgia 385 U.S. 545 (1967). 
Periodicals 
Bartholomew, Paul. "The Warren Court" National Review 
February 23, 1967. 
Berman, David. "Racial Issues and Mr. Black," 16 American 
University Law Review 386 (June, 1967). 
Black, Charles. "State Action, Equal Protection and Cali¬ 
fornia Proposition 14." 81 Harvard law Review 69 
(1969)• 
"Civil Rights Symposium" 43 University of Detroit Law Journal 
December, 1965 - 
Cox, Archibald. "Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and 
the Promotion of Human Rights," 80 Harvard Law Review 
123 (November, 1966). 
Davenport, Ronald. "The Second Justice Marshall" 7 Duquesne 
Law Review 44 (Fall, 1968). 
Donnici, Peter. "Protection of the Minorities: Mr. Justice 
Hugo Black," 32 University of Missouri at Kansas City 
Law Review 266 Summer, 1966. 
Dorsen, Norman. "The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: A Consti¬ 
tutional Conservative" 44 New York University Law 
Review 250 (April, 1969). 
74 
Grossman, Joel. "Dissenting Blocs on Warren Court" 24 
Journal of Politics 1028 (1968). 
 . "Social Background and Judicial Decisions" 29 
Journal of Politics 334 (1967). 
Howard, A. E. "Mr. Justice Black: The Negro Protest Move¬ 
ment and Rule of law," 53 Virginia Law Review 1030 
(June, 1967). 
Marshall, Thurgood. "Continuing Challenge of 14th Amend¬ 
ment" 3 Georgia Law Review 1 (1968). 
 . "Group Action in Pursuit of Justice" 44 New York 
University Law Review 661 (October, 1969). 
Nagel. Stuart. "Ethnic Affiliation and Judicial Propensity" 
24 Journal of Politics 92, 1962. 
New York Times Magazine. September 25, 1966. 
 . Oct. 13-Dec. 10, 1968. 
Nimmer, Melville. "A Proposal for Judicial Validation of a 
Previously Unconstitutional Law: The Civil Rights 
Act of 1875 65 Columbia University Law Review 1394 
(1965). 
Race Relations Law Reporter 1964-68. 
Reich, Charles. "Mr. Justice Black, and the Living Consti¬ 
tution" 76 Harvard Law Review 673 (Pebruary, 1963). 
Rice, Charles. "Justice Black: The Demonstrator and a 
Constitutional Rule of Law 14 UCLA Law Review 454 
(January 1, 1967). 
Strickland, Stephen. "Mr. Justice Black: A Reappraisal" 
25 Pederal Bar Journal 365 (Pall, 1965). 
75 
REFERENCE WORK 
Who's Who in American Politics 1969-1970. Edited hy Paul 
Theis and Edmund Henshaw, Jr., 2nd ed., New York: R. R. 
Bowker Company, 1969. 
